

## CHAPTER 4

### PERVERSIONS

In this chapter, which consists of three sections, I analyse the question of perversion in Cernuda's later poetry from a number of different angles. On the one hand, I use the term 'perversion' and its derivatives both to describe the relation between the dominant and subordinate terms of the oppositions 'natural/unnatural' and 'truth/error' in the articulation of male homosexuality and to refer to the relation between heterosexuality and male homosexual identity. On the other hand, I use perversion to describe particular forms of non-sexual identity and a structure common to all forms of sexuality. I begin the first section, which analyses the deployment of nature and truth in the representation of male same-sex desire, by examining the legitimation of male homosexuality in Cernuda's later poetry through the transgressive reinscription of the natural/unnatural opposition. I then discuss the applicability of some non-sexual meanings of perversion to Cernuda's work before analysing the links it establishes between truth and male homosexual identity. In the second section, I use psychoanalysis to examine how the representation of male homosexual identity in terms of masochism and self-shattering points towards a redefinition of men's relation to God (as also represented by the father). In as much as God has traditionally legitimated the natural/unnatural and truth/error oppositions, my argument in this section extends that of the first. In the third section, I draw on the psychoanalytic argument that all sexuality is structurally perverse to argue that the male same-sex desire represented in Cernuda's last four books of poetry points to an extension and reorganization of sexual pleasure.

My argument throughout this chapter resembles that of the previous one in as much as it focuses on the terms in which male homosexual identity is articulated. The questions of nature and the divine represent points of overlap with and divergence from my arguments in the previous two chapters since, in this chapter, I view nature as a means with which to legitimate male same-sex desire and argue that the sexualization of the divine raises the possibility of new relations between men and a new understanding of male homosexual identity.

#### *Nature, Truth, Male Homosexuality, and Perversion*

The theoretical source for my argument in this section is Jonathan Dollimore's complex analysis of the history of the concept and cultural dynamic of perversion in his book *Sexual Dissidence*.<sup>1</sup> Like Sedgwick

in *Epistemology of the Closet*, Dollimore not only interrogates the categories in which sexuality and, in particular, male homosexuality are represented but also argues that questions of sexual definition are always entwined with other (so-called) non-sexual issues. Dollimore seeks to defamiliarize the category of homosexuality through an analysis of the concept of perversion since he believes that recovering perversion's history entails rethinking some of the most fundamental categories that have been used to order and construct sexuality (p. 228). That male homosexuality embraces more than matters of sexual definition for Dollimore is made clear in his statements that homosexuality 'includes cultures, institutions, beliefs, practices, desires, aspirations, and much else' (p. 32) and that the 'paradoxical dynamics of perversion in its pre-sexological senses enable an account of dissidence within sexuality which is not [...] confined to sexuality' (p. 33).

Also like Sedgwick, Dollimore seeks to intervene in the debate between essentialist and constructionist understandings of sexual identity. However, rather than proposing an alternative theoretical framework as Sedgwick does, Dollimore argues against simplistic formulations of the opposition between essentialism and anti-essentialism and in favour of exploring that opposition in relation to the histories of different dissident cultures. The examination of these histories, according to Dollimore, reveals a greater degree of instability in the essentialist/anti-essentialist opposition than is often acknowledged in theoretical writing (pp. 25–26). As an example of this instability, at the end of his discussion of Gide and Wilde's encounter in Algiers, Dollimore states that, although 'divergent', Gide's essentialist and Wilde's anti-essentialist paths 'cross and reconverge' (p. 18).<sup>2</sup>

As Dollimore makes clear, the complexity and diversity of the history of perversion makes any definitive definition of it impossible. Nevertheless, he does offer a very general definition: typically, he argues, perversion involves a movement of 'erring, straying, deviation, or being diverted from' a 'path, destiny, or objective' which is 'understood as natural or right—usually right because natural (with the natural possibly having a yet higher legitimation in divine law)' (p. 104). It is, therefore, in part, the varied and historically specific forms of the natural/unnatural opposition that make it possible to conceive of perversion and deviation, whether as forms of demonization or cultural resistance (pp. 108–09).<sup>3</sup> Dollimore's definition also highlights a link between perversion and wandering from the true or right that has its roots in a pre-sexological history in which perversion could signify erring and error (p. 41).<sup>4</sup> Indeed, Dollimore argues that it is the theological understanding of perversion as 'deviation from the true faith to the false' that points to one of the 'paradoxes of the perverse' (p. 120) according to which the:

most extreme threat to the true form of something comes not so much from its absolute opposite or its direct negation, but in the form of its perversion; somehow the perverse threat is inextricably rooted in the true and the authentic, while being, in spite of (or rather because of) that connection, also the utter contradiction of the true and authentic.

(p. 121)

Another of these paradoxes, which partly explains the first, is the view that perversion is 'at once utterly alien to what it threatens, and yet, mysteriously inherent within it'. According to Dollimore, these paradoxes, which constitute part of the 'paradoxical perverse', can have a destabilizing effect because they reveal that the perverse threat originates inside that which it threatens (the dominant) even though it is perceived as external to it (p. 121).

Dollimore argues that the destabilizing potential of the paradoxical perverse is represented by the 'perverse dynamic', by which he understands 'certain instabilities and contradictions within dominant structures' which arise as a result of the 'interconnectedness' between the terms of a binary opposition (p. 33). For Dollimore, this interconnectedness consists of the 'antithetical inher[ing] within, and [being] partly produced by, what it opposes'. As this definition suggests, such interconnectedness should not be understood as unity or self-identity nor as meaning that the terms of an opposition are essentially the same. Central to this interconnectedness is 'the proximate', which Dollimore defines as something that is 'adjacent and *thereby* related temporally or spatially' to something else or as something that is drawing near in time or space or that is the 'opposite of *remote* or *ultimate*' (p. 33). According to Dollimore, the proximate is usually disavowed by the dominant and, as a result of a process of displacement, is often constructed as absolutely different to it, as the dominant's other. Despite this, Dollimore argues, the proximate also remains close by and facilitates 'transgressive reinscription' or the 'tracking-back of the "other" into the "same"' (p. 33). Such reinscription intensifies the instabilities generated by the perverse dynamic within the dominant norms and redirects them against those norms.'

In Cernuda's last four books of poetry, male homosexuality is repeatedly legitimated by being represented as natural. This representation takes, in part, the form of analogies between male same-sex desire and natural objects and descriptions of male homosexuality in relation to natural spatial and temporal frames. Obviously, this appropriation of nature does not seek to abolish the category of the natural but instead reflects an investment by the subordinate (male homosexuality) in the privileged term of the opposition natural/unnatural, an investment which it shares with the dominant culture. In Cernuda's later poetry nature is reworked by extending the category of the natural to male homosexuality rather than by inverting the dominant culture's use of that category. Nevertheless, the aim of this reworking is to reject the

dominant's deployment of nature as a means of legitimating heterosexuality and disqualifying male homosexuality. Instead of realigning the natural with male homosexuality and the unnatural with heterosexuality, the transgressive reinscription of nature in Cernuda's later work proposes that both forms of sexuality are natural. However, this does not make them the same and, as evidence of this, the redeployment of the natural is accompanied by an awareness of the difference between homo- and hetero-sexuality. Nevertheless, the representation of both sexualities as natural, the internal differentiation of nature, inscribes rather than disavows their proximity to one another.

The mediation of male homosexual desire through nature in 'Otros tulipanes amarillos' (pp. 363–65) represents the first stage in the reworking of the natural, its appropriation for the subordinate.<sup>6</sup> As Coleman (p. 57) and Harris (p. 132) have stated, the speaker's description of an affair that the male 'tú' had with another man in a previous spring (ll. 23–29) is stimulated by the sight of yellow tulips in the misty, wet spring of the present (ll. 1–7). The tulips and spring serve, therefore, as frames through which to view male homosexuality. This framing function is emphasized by the description of the past and present springs as summarized ('cifrada[s]', l. 10) in the tulips, a description in which the spring, the temporal setting for the pleasures of love between men, is presented to us metonymically through the tulips (ll. 8–11). Other instances of the naturalization of male homosexuality are the comparison of the 'tú's desire with a plant (ll. 12–13) and the spring's illusory omens (l. 21), its branches of cherry blossom and warm southerly winds (ll. 17–18).<sup>7</sup> Although these omens are said to have seduced the 'tú' as signs announcing the fulfilment of his love, they did not actually exist, as Coleman has also noted (p. 57), since they were 'presagios *ilusorios*' (l. 21; my emphasis). This suggests that the lover fed his desire by appropriating the blossoming cherry trees and the warm breeze, by bestowing on nature a significance it did not have. The figuration of male homosexual desire in natural terms is also found in the poem's final three lines, where the speaker instructs the 'tú' to continue responding to the so-called promptings of spring by calling out to 'los cuerpos' and learning 'ese silencio' (ll. 42–44).<sup>8</sup> The silence (l. 44) which the speaker mentions is not only that caused by oblivion devouring the names of the 'tú's homosexual desire, his imperious affects (ll. 39–40), but also the lost sound with which the tulips' colour was compared at the end of the first stanza (ll. 6–7).

In the penultimate stanza, the 'tú's body is associated with the night and cyclical time when it is described as a waning moon (l. 37), a description that contradicts Coleman's assertion that nature and the human body follow a different 'continuum' in this poem (pp. 56, 57). His body is waning because

it is being consumed by his memories (l. 36), including that of his former lover (ll. 23–29), and not, as Jiménez-Fajardo has argued, by ‘oblivion’ (p. 84). Despite this image’s destructiveness, which could imply pathology, the ‘tú’’s relation to his past and his fading desire in the present are framed as natural as a result of the comparison between life and leaves freezing on a tree, the wind destroying a flower, and the sky clouding over (ll. 30–37). Although these events appear to represent nature as a site of unpredictable change in linear time, they are, in fact, as Jiménez-Fajardo has indicated (p. 84), moments in a cycle of death and rebirth to which the ‘tú’’s desire is also subject because they are analogous to the ‘tú’’s relation to his past in which his body is compared with a moon. It is the return of the moon implied by the body–moon comparison that leads me to disagree with Jiménez-Fajardo’s comment that death is ‘changed from [...] a decrease to an increase *and back again*’ in this poem (pp. 84–85; my emphasis) and with Olivio Jiménez’s differing view of death in this poem as ‘negación absoluta’ (‘Emoción’, pp. 138–39).

Nature is also central to the representation of male homosexuality in ‘Después’ (p. 459).<sup>9</sup> For example, the lovers’ desire is awoken by the return of the spring (ll. 1–4), as Harris (p. 135) and Jiménez-Fajardo (p. 124) have pointed out, and the youth’s spell (ll. 5–7) is imagined as again running through their bodies like sap. In keeping with these natural frames, the mention of spray and wind in the men’s hair (l. 4) suggests that they are cruising on a beach (whence also the reference to their glances; l. 3). The analogy between homosexual love and the vegetable world and the linking of homosexuality to cyclical time are also found in ‘El fuego’ (pp. 389–91).<sup>10</sup> In this poem, the ‘tú’’s love is described as rooted in his body as deeply as a tree in the earth (ll. 10–13) and both his love and the poplar tree by which he thought his love are subject to the same process (ll. 35–36). Furthermore, the descriptions of the ‘tú’’s love in ‘El fuego’ as destined to live only one summer (ll. 10–11) and of his body as invernal (l. 28) suggest that his emotions and body change in accordance with the seasons. Similarly, in ‘Ofrenda’ (p. 327), the ‘tú’’s love evolves in accordance with the seasons: in the spring, he seeks the gods’ favour with offerings of garlands (ll. 1–4) and then, in the winter, is unable to realize his love the object of which is compared with leaves, among other things (ll. 5–8).<sup>11</sup> Also, the comparison of his desire in winter to a living seed sown as an offering to the gods (ll. 10–12) suggests that his desire’s wintry non-fulfilment is analogous to the seed’s germinating below ground. Finally, in ‘Haciéndose tarde’ (pp. 475–76), natural events are used to justify the re-emergence of the ‘tú’’s homosexual desire: the speaker tells the ‘tú’ that he should not think that the season for his new love (l. 7) is over because the lark’s song, for example,

always fills the morning (ll. 9–10) and, in the poem's final lines, the speaker orders love to break open the doors of linear time (ll. 17–18).<sup>12</sup> In a similar vein, Harris argues that, by comparing his love to natural phenomena, Cernuda stresses its naturalness despite the lateness of its arrival in his life (p. 142).

In 'La familia' (pp. 334–37), male homosexuality is again articulated through the category of the natural, a category that, in this poem, is internally divided.<sup>13</sup> Although the poem's title includes the male 'tú's sisters, the speaker only mentions them once (ll. 11–12) and concentrates on the 'tú's relation with his parents. Natural images recur throughout the poem and describe both the parents and the 'tú'. For instance, the family home is described as Man's nest (l. 14) and the 'tú's parents are specified as mammals by the reference to their 'fauces' (l. 37). Similarly, the speaker describes the young 'tú' as both a defenceless and a destructive animal (ll. 41, 50). However, although both the 'tú' and his parents are natural, they are differentiated in two respects. Firstly, the 'tú' does not receive his identity from his parents (ll. 49–53) and, secondly, the 'tú' and his parents are distinguished by their respective approaches to a love which is compared with fire. This difference is implicit in the speaker's comment that, following the experience of his parents' love, the 'tú' learnt to hate 'el amor que no sabe/Arder anónimo sin recompensa alguna' (l. 62). It is the similarity between the 'tú's love in 'El fuego' (ll. 18–24) and this description that makes it possible to code the 'tú's love in 'La familia' as one for other men.<sup>14</sup> Therefore, although both parties love naturally, they do so differently. A similar internal division of nature is found in the comparisons between the freedom of the 'tú's identity and water which rises from a spring and flows to the sea (ll. 54–56) and between time and a river which freed the 'tú' by destroying his parents and their tyranny (ll. 64–67). While the first comparison exemplifies the use of nature to affirm male homosexual identity, the second is a dramatic example of nature being turned against the dominant culture. The speaker's deployment of fire and water, therefore, creates a space for the 'tú's identity which does not posit reproductive heterosexuality as the other of male homosexuality but, rather, articulates their indissociability. This interconnectedness, which Harris (p. 146) and Jiménez-Fajardo (p. 83) overlook in their emphasis on the difference of Cernuda's desire, is reinforced by the similarity between the description of the lovers as birds in 'Otros tulipanes amarillos' (ll. 19–20, 28–29) and 'El amigo' (pp. 386–87; ll. 31–35) and that of the parental home as a nest in 'La familia' (l. 14).<sup>15</sup>

The 'tú' and his parents also differ in their respective degrees of self-consciousness. For example, the 'tú's parents are described as adopting an

attitude of unthinking repetition to reproductive sex (ll. 25–29) and as unable to learn the lessons discernible in their surroundings (ll. 33–36). In contrast, the speaker defines the ‘tú’ as a force of solitude that wins his truth through his mistakes (ll. 52–53), that is, as able to draw conclusions from his experience. In addition, rather than copying others’ actions, the ‘tú’ is self-sufficient (l. 52) and, consequently, his actions possess an inner urgency that his parents’ lacked (l. 28). Later in the poem, however, the differential value of self-sufficiency and reflection and, therefore, the ‘tú’'s status as his parents’ supposed other are brought into question. After the death of the ‘tú’'s parents, their memory makes the ‘tú’ smile sadly as he transgresses their moral code (ll. 70–73) and the speaker asks whether all human actions are, as the ‘tú’ now believes, the fruit of imitation and unconsciousness (ll. 76–77). This question posits the ‘tú’'s identity as just as imitative and lacking in consciousness as his parents’, and, therefore, as apparently the same as his parents’. However, that the ‘tú’ reflects on the nature of his identity while his parents do not suggests that the imitation and unconsciousness of his identity do not make reflection altogether impossible and, therefore, do not entirely remove its differential value. Consequently, the question (ll. 76–77) portrays the difference between the ‘tú’ and his parents in terms of proximity rather than opposition. The proximity of their difference was hinted at earlier in the poem by the echo in the description of the ‘tú’ as ‘fuerza de soledad’ (l. 52) of that of his parents, in the context of their inability to learn from experience, as ‘dos soledades’ (l. 40). The ‘tú’'s transgressive identity, therefore, inheres within but also differs from that of his parents.<sup>16</sup> In the same vein, the ‘tú’'s love does not fit easily into ‘la herencia humana’ (l. 80) to which it belongs and in which people unintentionally do good and bad (l. 82). The uneasiness of that relation is indicated by the description of the ‘tú’'s desire as ‘esta *extraña* llama’ (l. 78; my emphasis) and the possibility that he will go to hell after his death (ll. 83–84). The ‘tú’ wishes, not unreasonably, to avoid such a fate but without renouncing the difference or so-called strangeness of his desire. It is the longing for this difficult balance that leads the speaker to hope that the poem will bring forgiveness and peace both to the ‘tú’ and to his parents (ll. 88–94). This element of reciprocity has been caught by, among others, Jiménez-Fajardo, who argues that, at the end of the poem, the ‘tú’ ‘extends’ his new-found ‘understanding’ to his parents, to ‘those who lacked it’ in his childhood (p. 82). While it is also implicit in Pato’s belief that, in ‘La familia’, Cernuda offers himself up ‘en petición de paz, de perdón y de comprensión’ (p. 65), Ugarte argues, in contrast, that Cernuda only ‘seeks to understand and accept’ himself and his difference in this poem (pp. 184–85).

In 'Peregrino' (pp. 530–31), the male 'tú's identity as a wanderer or pilgrim is linked with his rejection of reproduction.<sup>17</sup> In the first stanza, the speaker states that men who return home are tired of travelling and long for their home environment (ll. 1–5), while, in the second, he contrasts the 'tú' with such men and writes that he plans to:

Seguir libre adelante,  
 Disponible por siempre, mozo o viejo,  
 Sin hijo que te busque, como a Ulises,  
 Sin Ítaca que aguarde y sin Penélope.  
 (l. 7)

By using the verb 'pensar' to describe the 'tú's attitude to returning (l. 6), the speaker foregrounds the element of reflection in his present situation and establishes a link between consciousness and the 'tú's sexual identity reminiscent of that in 'La familia', which suggests that the 'tú' in 'Peregrino' is also homosexual. The 'tú's identity is perverse in a non-sexual sense given that, in the poem's final stanza, he is described as being loyal to a difficult destiny (ll. 11–15), a description that recalls Dollimore's suggestion that the 'wilful integrity' with which Gide legitimated his sexual identity could itself be considered a form of perversity (p. 13). Indeed, one of the paradoxes of the perverse that Dollimore identifies and that is applicable to 'Peregrino' is that whereby perversion lies 'not in the deviation, but the refusal to deviate' (p. 121, fn. 8).

The non-sexual meaning of perversion as wilful integrity and this paradox of the perverse combine with male same-sex desire in 'La escarcha' (pp. 388–89), the third poem in the series 'Cuatro poemas a una sombra'.<sup>18</sup> In the first half of the poem, the male 'tú' remembers an affair with another man. However, his memories now jar with him and strike him merely as cold, ugly imitations of the affair (ll. 1–18). This leads him, in the next stanza, to feel that, after the affair, love is nothing but a disconsolate shadow over a few transitory fields in which he searches for the constant shape of things (ll. 19–24). Nevertheless, this inconsolable perspective is countered by an omen (l. 26) within the 'tú' which tells him neither to renounce nor to seek comfort for his desire but, rather, in an echo of the last stanza of 'Peregrino', to continue to desire in the midst of adversity (ll. 31–36). The perversity of such advice is underlined by the description of the omen as mad (l. 36), while that of the 'tú' in heeding the omen is reinforced by the ambivalent meaning of the noun 'presagio' (l. 26): 'señal que anuncia suerte o desgracia' (Moliner, *Diccionario*, II, p. 833). Such perversity combines with hope and paradox in 'Otra fecha' (p. 466) where, despite everything, the 'tú' continues to be both attracted and deceived by the future (ll. 13–14)

and knows this because, paradoxically, he involuntarily continues to believe in the future even though he does not believe in anything despite wanting to (ll. 17–20).<sup>19</sup> The ‘tú’'s perversity bears fruit in ‘El viajero’ (pp. 457–58) in which he has reached a place where his reality and dreams coincide (ll. 17–18), that is, one of those places where, in ‘La escarcha’ (ll. 29–30), he was told he could find his spiritual centre.<sup>20</sup>

In ‘Aplauso humano’ (pp. 360–61), a further non-sexual meaning of perversion is interwoven with male homosexual desire.<sup>21</sup> In the fourth stanza, the speaker tells the ‘tú’ that he will pay a high price for being faithful to himself (ll. 13–14). Such faithfulness, to which Harris (pp. 114–15, 155) and Ugarte (p. 169) also draw attention, can, as I have already suggested, itself be considered a type of perversity. The ‘tú’'s integrity in such adverse circumstances recalls that of the ‘tú’ in ‘La escarcha’ and ‘Peregrino’ and, as a result, posits his sexual identity as homosexual.<sup>22</sup> The speaker’s opinion that ‘desvío/Siempre es razón mejor ante la grey’ (l. 15) exemplifies that “*perverse temper*” which, according to the definition Dollimore quotes from a nineteenth-century edition of Webster’s dictionary, “likes or dislikes by the rule of contradiction to another’s will” (p. 107). The speaker is, therefore, also perverse because he advocates basing a relation to the herd on a principle (deviation) which is always applicable, regardless of the circumstances (l. 16). Furthermore, the principle which the speaker proposes as the basis of that relation is precisely that of perversion or deviation.

The construction of the ‘tú’'s homosexual identity in opposition to that of heterosexual culture, as the dominant culture’s other, is underlined by the speaker’s use of prepositions which confront the ‘tú’ and the herd. For example, he states that pedants, journalists, and even rudimentary yokels will think themselves perfect when faced with (‘frente a’) the ‘tú’ (ll. 5–8) and that deviation is an absolute principle in the face of (‘ante’) the herd (ll. 15–16). However, according to Dollimore, such alterity is the effect of a displacement made possible by the proximity of the so-called other to the dominant (p. 141). In ‘Aplauso humano’, this proximity, which has tended to be overlooked by critics seeking to emphasize Cernuda’s otherness or difference (for example, Jiménez-Fajardo, p. 73; Ugarte, pp. 168–69), is suggested by three factors. Firstly, although the ‘tú’'s honesty about his sexual identity means that the herd will be able to insult and mock him (l. 4), the speaker states that the ‘tú’ should pervert their insults by interpreting them as (albeit unpleasant) forms of praise or identification (ll. 23–24). The hostility of the herd not only posits the ‘tú’ as other but also, according to the speaker, conceals an unacknowledged admiration for him, which presupposes that the ‘tú’ represents an ideal which the herd would like to imitate, which is internal to it. Secondly, in the final stanza, the speaker describes the ‘tú’ as living

among ('entre') Mankind (l. 22) rather than as outside or opposite it. In both these instances, the other has tracked back into the same, in keeping with Ruiz Silva's belief that the boundary between 'marginación y no marginación (no digo integración)' is relatively easy to cross (p. 104). This tracking-back is also suggested by the appropriation for the 'tú's desire of the derogatory link made between orality and love in the speaker's description of marital sexuality. In referring to the (sexual) truth of the 'tú's lips (l. 21), the speaker echoes the description of the married couple's parsimonious thirst for love which is satisfied by conjugal dishwater (ll. 1-3). As a result of this transgressive appropriation, a characteristic belonging to the dominant emerges in a different light in the subordinate with potentially disruptive consequences for the former.<sup>23</sup>

The basis of this transgressive reinscription is the truth of the 'tú's sexual identity, to which, like the 'tú' in 'Peregrino', he remains loyal. In keeping with this, according to the speaker in 'Aplauso humano', the 'tú's poetry makes visible a truth (l. 4) which is implicitly sexual and the 'tú' refuses to lie in order to enjoy a compliment with official goodwill (ll. 9-12). However, the link between truth and sexual identity in Cernuda's later poetry is complex and, at times, paradoxical as a result of its interweaving with error. The link between epistemological mistakes ('error') and wandering ('errar') also plays a part in the articulation of male homosexual identity in Cernuda's last four books of poetry. For example, in 'Otros tulipanes amarillos', Spring is said to send the homosexual 'tú' off along the path of transgression ('los yerros', l. 16). Similarly, the description of the 'tú' in 'La familia' as winning the truth about himself with his errors (l. 53) suggests that his relation to his true self is not given but, rather, requires a detour through mistakes in order to be realized. At the same time, the speaker's use of the gerund (l. 53) to describe the 'tú's relation to his true self implies that that relation is dynamic rather than a goal that he achieves once and for all. In other words, error can always reappear because the possibility will always remain that what the 'tú' thought was a relation to his true self was, in fact, a relation to a false self. Consequently, the relation between truth and error in the development of the 'tú's homosexual identity exemplifies that paradox of the perverse identified by Dollimore whereby error threatens truth while inhering within and simultaneously opposing truth (p. 121). This paradox means that the honesty which the speaker attributes to the 'tú' in his relation with himself and his parents in 'La familia' (ll. 31-32) and with the herd in 'Aplauso humano' is implicitly problematic and provisional. The appropriation of truth by and for a subordinate sexual identity in Cernuda's later poetry, therefore, is regularly accompanied by an awareness of truth's inextricability from falsity.

Like the other men in the poems I have analysed in this chapter, the male 'tú' of 'Nocturno yanqui' (pp. 445–49) is homosexual (ll. 96–98).<sup>24</sup> In this poem, the 'tú' feels remorse at becoming conscious of having been young when he no longer is young (ll. 57–61). The speaker describes this awareness in terms both of the 'tú's youthfulness hurting inside the 'tú' and of the 'tú' being his youth's avenging prey. These lines (ll. 57–63) suggest an identification between the 'tú' and his youthful self in three ways. Firstly, just as the 'tú' feels remorse (ll. 57–60), the 'tú's youth feels pain as a result of knowing that the 'tú's age makes its existence pointless (ll. 62–67). Secondly, it is difficult to think of the 'tú's youth, his former self, as being in pain and not also hurting the 'tú'. And, thirdly, an identification is implied by the pain common to the descriptions of the 'tú's youth and of the 'tú' as its prey (l. 63). As a consequence, the 'tú's identity and knowledge of himself in the present are inextricable from perversion in the senses of error and wandering. On the one hand, they are built on his mistake of not realizing that he was young when he was (ll. 58–60), while, on the other, the importance to his present identity of his youth implies that, paradoxically, he must wander from himself in order to be himself.<sup>25</sup>

A little later in the poem, the speaker reflects on the 'tú's life and comments that the 'tú's goals in life have been to become worthy of his own and others' respect and esteem and constantly to be himself in a better way (ll. 86–90). For the speaker, these goals are equivalent to the 'tú' constantly seeking a youthful myth that he can serve and, by doing so, be himself (ll. 98–100). By implication, the more worthy the 'tú' becomes of his own and others' respect and esteem, the more truly he will be himself. However, as he pursues his goals, the 'tú' hopes that his pretext will be justified (ll. 91–94). In other words, the 'tú's pursuit of his goals is made possible by what María Moliner defines as a 'razón que se alega falsamente para hacer [...] cierta cosa' (*Diccionario*, II, p. 839). The motor of the 'tú's life, therefore, is a lie, the lie that his destiny and love for a youthful myth (ll. 96–98), for his youthful self (l. 101), moved him to pursue his goals. Falsity is also integral to the 'tú's identity in a second sense since the creature he sought to serve was a 'mito' (l. 98), an invention which he tried to make pass for the truth. Paradoxically, therefore, the 'tú' was himself by serving a fake. A few lines later, the speaker's question—'¿[E]s la verdad del hombre/Para él solo [?]' (ll. 102–03)—performs a powerful perversion of truth: Man's truth (the truth that the 'tú's life is driven by and aims at a lie) is that of truth's absence or replacement by a lie.<sup>26</sup> This is also implicit in the speaker's subsequent statement that:

Quien eres, tu vida era;  
 Uno sin otro no sois,  
 Tú lo sabes.  
 Y es fuerza seguir, entonces,  
 Aun el miraje perdido.  
 (l. 107)

This statement empties the 'tú's identity of all substance since the dependence of his present identity on his past identity (ll. 107–08) is, in fact, a dependence on a lost 'miraje' (l. 111) or youthful myth (l. 98). Whereas in 'La familia', truth (albeit in a provisional and tentative form) was the basis of the 'tú's identity, in this poem, his identity is grounded on a falsity that, paradoxically, is described as the truth of Mankind.

This perversion of the relation between truth, falsity, and identity is taken one step further in 'La partida' (pp. 423–24) in which falsity is put forward as the sole principle of male homosexual identity.<sup>27</sup> The poem alternates between descriptions of a man on board a ship who is leaving a country to which he has no intention of returning and flashbacks to scenes from his life in that country. Although there is no explicit link between the man's wandering and his sexual identity, the echoes of 'Peregrino' and 'La escarcha' allow an implicit connection to be made. Error is constitutive of the man's identity in two senses. Firstly, as he looks back at the country he has left, he sees the last ten years of his life rubbed out like a mistake (ll. 16–18). Secondly, and more significantly, he states both that he originally arrived in the country he is now leaving as a result of error and that he is now leaving it as the result of another error (ll. 26–27). Whereas the 'tú' in 'Peregrino' founded his sexual identity on conscious thought (l. 6), in 'La partida', the speaker appears not to be a rational agent but, rather, to be blown about by error. Furthermore, in contrast to 'La familia', where error led to a problematically and provisionally true identity, truth is entirely absent in 'La partida' and the only relation the speaker can have to himself is a mistaken one. However, as the change from the third person singular to the first person singular in the last stanza (ll. 26–28) shows, the speaker is at least conscious that his identity is determined by the constant reassertion of error.

### *Male Homosexuality and Self-Shattering*

In his general definition of perversion which I have already quoted, Dollimore states that perversion involves a movement of deviation from a path or goal which is perceived as natural or right and that the natural is at times legitimated by divine law (p. 104). It should come as no surprise, therefore, that as well as the reworking of the natural/unnatural opposition, a

redefinition of men's relation to the divine (of which I take the father to be a symbol) is also found in Cernuda's later poetry.

My starting point in this section is Leo Bersani's essay 'The Gay Daddy' in which he explores the modulation of sadism by masochism and, in a related move, seeks to reinstate the father as an object of male homosexual desire.<sup>28</sup> In the first twenty pages of his essay, Bersani argues that sadomasochism not only crudely raises questions about the link between pleasure and the exercise of power but also unwittingly invites an analysis of the 'defeat, or at least the modulation, of power by the very pleasure inherent in its exercise' (p. 83). Ultimately, according to Bersani, even though it does not share the oppressive intentionality of the structure of domination and subordination which organizes social relations, sadomasochism's pleasures are derived from that same structure. Sadomasochism, therefore, imagines pleasure in a way which is 'almost entirely defined by the dominant culture' (p. 87) and which does not challenge the structure of authority itself. However, sadomasochism does challenge the 'hypocrisy of authority' by revealing that the exercise of power is accompanied by an intense pleasure that the powerful usually deny (p. 87). For Bersani, sadomasochism's value derives from its 'shocking revelation' that, for the sake of sadomasochistic stimulation, 'human beings may be willing to give up control over their environment' (p. 95). Such a willingness, Bersani argues, characterizes masochists, who are defined by their 'potentially dysfunctional rejection of pain', that is, of the body's or ego's 'protection against self-dissolution' (p. 94). As a result, sadomasochism stages the 'potential ecstasy in both a hyperbolic sense of self [sadism] and the self's renunciation of its claims on the world [masochism]' (p. 95).

An important feature of sadomasochism, and one that Bersani highlights, is the reversibility of the participants' roles. Two effects of such reversibility are to disrupt the fixed distribution of positions of power and powerlessness and to denaturalize the link between power and gender or race. Role reversibility, according to Bersani, also allows us to speculate that the 'temptation' to renounce power is 'inherent in the very exercise of power' (p. 96). It is as if, Bersani goes on, the 'excitement of a hyperbolic self-assertion, of an unthwarted mastery over the world and [...] brutalization of the other, were inseparable from an impulse of self-dissolution' (p. 96) or 'masochistic jouissance' by which it could potentially be modulated (p. 99). For Bersani, jouissance is synonymous with the extended erotogenicity discussed by Freud in his *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality* and is related to masochism in that it shatters the self or 'disrupts the ego's coherence and dissolves its boundaries' (p. 101).<sup>29</sup> In the same vein, in *The Freudian Body* Bersani had argued that sexuality was ontologically grounded in masochism (p. 39), adding that its 'constitutive excitement' is the same

regardless of the type of sexual or supposedly non-sexual acts in which it is manifested (p. 40).<sup>30</sup>

For Bersani, Freud's case-history of the Wolf Man offers not only one of psychoanalysis' 'most morbid genealogies of homosexual desire' ('The Gay Daddy', p. 108) but also one form of resistance to the 'violence and avidity for power' that, according to Bersani, inheres in all intimate dealings between human beings.<sup>31</sup> The resistance that Bersani has in mind is a resistance 'in the Foucauldian sense' (p. 108), that is, a resistance that is produced from within the exercise of power itself.<sup>32</sup> The case-history revolves around a scene of parental love-making that, on the basis of a dream his patient had at the age of four, Freud claims his patient witnessed aged one-and-a-half. According to Freud, this dream caused his patient to repress his desire for his father because it reminded/showed him that the price of the realization of that desire was castration. For Bersani, the strangest part of Freud's interpretation of this scene of parental love-making is that it corresponds neither to Freud's own construction of the scene nor to Freud's account of his patient's version of it. One example that Bersani gives of this non-correspondence is that, in his dream, the boy does not have a terrified relation to his father as one would expect given the castrating function that Freud attributes to the father. Instead, Bersani points out, according to Freud himself, 'compassion for the father' was, 'from the very beginning', part of the scene of parental coitus as both he and his patient reconstructed it (p. 110). One form that the boy's compassion took after the dream was his attempt to distinguish his father from the 'cruel and punishing Father of Christianity', a compassion that, importantly, Bersani classifies as one of the 'remarkably tender paternal feelings' that the boy felt towards his father (p. 109). However, Bersani argues, instead of acknowledging that his patient loves his father and does not perceive him as threatening him with castration, Freud insists on giving the father the 'dubious privilege of exercising his castrating prerogative' (p. 110) because, for Freud, nothing would stand in the way of the 'confirmation of murderous relations among men' (p. 111).

Bersani picks up on Freud's comment that compassion for the father was part of the boy's primal scene and, disagreeing with Freud, argues that the young boy expressed his compassion by defecating. According to Bersani, the boy's compassion was motivated by his identification with his father's so-called loss of his penis inside his wife's body during love-making and his defecation was an attempt to compensate his father for that loss. Bersani argues that, as a result of this compensatory gesture, the scene of parental love-making gives rise both to the threat of power (in the shape of the castrating father who forces the repression of his son's homosexual desire) and to its 'transference' or 'reciprocity' (p. 110). Whereas Freud describes

the relation between father and son as one of permanent separation as a result of a 'threat of violence that forces the repression of love', Bersani rereads their relation as a 'gentler exchange' (p. 112). In this exchange, the son's power consists of his ability to compensate his father for the supposed loss of his penis and is 'improvised as a response to the vulnerability [signalled by that loss] inherent in the very position and exercise of power'. Such vulnerability, Bersani makes clear, does not stem from the father's fear of castration but, rather, from the risk he takes in 'merging with another, [...] risking [his] own boundaries for the sake of self-dissolving extensions' (p. 112). Therefore, the son's power lies in his ability to enable his father to experience (rather than deny) the pleasures of masochistic *jouissance* and, thereby, to abandon his position of sadistic authority. Consequently, in this gentler relation, the father's sadism is modulated by the masochistic pleasure to which he gains access through his son. This new relation between father and son is not sadomasochistic because, in it, pleasure derives not from the reproduction of the polarized structures of political oppression but from their undermining. Another way of describing this new relation is to say that it enables the father to disappear without dying or to achieve the '*nonsuicidal disappearance of the subject*' (p. 99). Such a '*nonsuicidal disappearance*' makes it impossible to locate the subject as an 'object of discipline' (p. 99) and, therefore, may provide a means of specifying a male homosexual identity without fixing it within the 'disciplinary constraints of identity' (p. 101).

A link is repeatedly made in Cernuda's later poetry between love and violence, in the form of domination and submission. Although the presence of these terms encourages a sadomasochistic reading, such a reading of Cernuda's poetry (which has never, in fact, been done) would overlook the masochistic shattering of the sadistic position. In my extension of Bersani's model of male homosexual identity to Cernuda's later poetry, I shall focus primarily on a number of poems in the series *Poemas para un cuerpo*. The 'yo' in whose name the majority of these poems are written describes himself as 'Luis Cernuda' and his lover (to whom most of the poems are addressed) as 'Salvador'. In order to prevent an overhasty identification of the Luis Cernuda of these poems with the historical subject Luis Cernuda, I shall refer to the former simply as 'Luis'. In keeping with this, the same gesture that has tempted critics such as Kitching-Schulman (pp. 129, 136) and José Romera Castillo to read these poems autobiographically—the statement in 'Para ti, para nadie' (pp. 471–72) that 'yo, este Luis Cernuda/Incógnito [...] /Estas líneas escribo' (ll. 11, 13)—also, paradoxically, problematizes such a reading by describing the historical subject as unknown.<sup>33</sup>

In 'Salvador' (pp. 469–70), Luis's destiny is abolished and entirely dependent on Salvador's actions in as much as Luis is waiting for Salvador either to save or condemn him (ll. 1–3).<sup>34</sup> That masochism is synonymous with Luis's desire is made clear in lines seven to nine in which the speaker implores Salvador to condemn Luis. To the same effect, in 'Amor en música' (pp. 464–65), pleasure and pain merge in love (ll. 27–28).<sup>35</sup> The stated purpose of the condemnation in 'Salvador' is not to relieve Luis's pain but to release him so that he can repeat his present experience of suffering in relation to another man (ll. 8–9). At the same time, the speaker also implores Salvador to save Luis from himself and from him (Salvador) (ll. 4–5). Salvador is a threat to Luis because he is directing his sadism at Luis, a sadism which, when combined with his omnipotence (suggested by Luis's complete powerlessness; ll. 2–3), indicates that he occupies the supposedly desexualized position of the castrating father. Salvador would save Luis by sexualizing his own position or modulating his sadism through an identification with Luis's masochism. However, as the speaker suggests in lines four to five, Luis's masochism in the present represents a danger to himself since it implicitly takes the form of an identification with the masochist's 'potentially dysfunctional rejection of pain' ('The Gay Daddy', p. 94) in a sadomasochistic context (indicated by the polarization of roles between the two men). Consequently, Luis's salvation from himself would entail his salvation from a masochism tied to the deadly structure of domination and submission (p. 97). As will become apparent, Luis's salvation partly involves his identification with the paternal/sadistic position or, as Silver says in relation to 'Salvador', his becoming 'whole' ('Arcadia', p. 120). However, this identification does not lead Luis to abandon the pleasures of masochism.

In terms borrowed from Bersani's analysis of the Wolf Man case-history, Luis wishes Salvador to feel compassion for him (to save him) and offers himself to Salvador as compensation for the vulnerability Salvador would experience in identifying with his (Luis's) masochism. In other words, Luis occupies the position of the son in the Wolf Man case-history and that of the insertee in Bersani's account of homosexual desire. He offers himself to Salvador just as the insertee offers his penis to his lover as that 'protectiveness' that helps 'all human beings' to risk their 'own boundaries for the sake of self-dissolving extensions' (p. 112). At the same time, if Salvador responded compassionately to Luis, he would place himself in the filial role and Luis in the paternal position. (Paradoxically, even Salvador's condemnation of Luis would be a compassionate act since it would imply his momentary acknowledgement of or identification with Luis's suffering.) Consequently, in Luis and Salvador's relationship, each man would act as

both father and son for the other, each would provide the other with the protectiveness necessary for each to dissolve the boundaries of his self.

Luis returns to the beginning of his relationship with Salvador in 'Precio de un cuerpo' (pp. 482–83) and states that Salvador was unconscious of his sadistic effect on him, an unconsciousness fully in keeping with Salvador's resistance to the pleasures of self-loss implied by his non-identification with Luis in 'Salvador'.<sup>36</sup> In the opening lines of 'Precio de un cuerpo', Luis writes that a beautiful body such as Salvador's does not understand its attractive force (ll. 1–3) and, at the end of the poem, he states that Salvador was unaware of his effect on him (ll. 21–23). The violence involved in the arousal of Luis's desire is made clear in the final stanza's metaphor of Salvador ambushing or trapping the unwilling Luis, his prey. That the price of taking pleasure in Salvador's beauty, of being attacked by him, is described as a hell of anguish and desire (l. 25) reiterates the inextricability of Luis's desire from masochism. However, Luis's masochism is also interwoven with an identification with the father's position. On the one hand and in keeping with his masochism, he describes love as a humiliating servitude (l. 6), while, on the other, he refers to love as:

Necesidad de gastar la ternura  
En un ser que llenamos  
Con nuestro pensamiento,  
Vivo de nuestra vida.  
(l. 7)

In these lines, Luis occupies the paternal position by claiming to infuse life into Salvador, a claim which is echoed in line thirteen of 'De dónde vienes' (pp. 477–78) and which posits him as equivalent to a god.<sup>37</sup> Luis's desire is, therefore, one in which sadistic identification is constantly shattered by masochistic pleasure.

The defensiveness of the paternal position is clearly outlined in 'Divinidad celosa' (pp. 483–84), in which God is said to be jealous of the homosexual lovers because they are no longer alone (ll. 5–8).<sup>38</sup> In other words, God is not, but would like to be, the object of a man's affections. However, by only describing God as jealous when the lovers are together and not revealing how He reacts once He has separated them, the speaker gives the impression that His jealousy ends with their separation and that He does not seek to overcome his loneliness by becoming a lover himself. Indeed, by insisting that the lover give up his beloved (ll. 10–12), God is able to repress/forget his jealousy and his own desire. God's punishing/castrating actions are, therefore, a defence against the appeal of homosexual desire, against the pleasure of self-loss experienced in desiring another man. Consequently, God's exercise of power

is characterized by the unmodulated sadism of an unreconstructed father. A similar defensiveness can also be seen in 'Después de hablar' (pp. 474–75) in which an anonymous speaker complains about Luis not keeping silent about his love (ll. 1–5) and repeatedly tells him not to talk about his love (ll. 3–5, 11–12, 15–16).<sup>39</sup>

That things are very different between Luis and Salvador is suggested by Luis's statement in 'Viviendo sueños' (pp. 476–77) that there is nothing in the world that is worth Salvador's presence (ll. 16–18), that Salvador is an object of great value for him.<sup>40</sup> As will become apparent, this places Salvador in the son's position. In keeping with this, Luis identifies with the paternal position in as much as he claims that Salvador only exists in his (Luis's) thoughts (ll. 23–24). As in 'Precio de un cuerpo', Luis's thought, god-like, brings Salvador to life or gives him existence. However, echoing the speaker's claim in 'Salvador' that Salvador could save Luis from a deadly masochistic identification, Luis's identification with the father saves him and is accompanied by life (ll. 13–15). As the interweaving of the men's roles in their relationship suggests, Luis's salvation is not at the expense of Salvador's death. In their relationship, the men's identities are modified in opposing, but interrelated and not exclusive, ways. On the one hand, Luis moves from a deadly identification with masochism to a sadistic identification which continues to acknowledge the pleasures of masochism while, on the other, Salvador's initial unconscious identification with sadism is modified by his identification with the son's position. The men's relationship, therefore, is characterized by a reversibility of roles not only between the two men but also, and simultaneously, by a modulation of each role within each man.

Just as Bersani described the relations between men outlined by his analysis of the Wolf Man case-history as a gentler exchange, so, in 'Salvador', the speaker states that Salvador's salvation of Luis would be accompanied by a reduction of violence achieved by dissolving the boundaries between the two men (ll. 5–6). Similarly, in 'Un hombre con su amor' (pp. 484–85), the men's sexual contact, while not penetrative, is described as the experience of peace and is simultaneous with Luis's enjoyment of the masochistic pleasures of self-shattering (ll. 6–7).<sup>41</sup> That such self-oblivion represents the modulation of Luis's paternal identification is suggested in the remainder of the poem which makes clear that Luis's love cannot be realized without Salvador's body (ll. 17–20) and that his love is a paternal love (ll. 15–16) which contains within itself its own modulation through self-shattering (ll. 9–12).

According to Luis, the peace of self-dissolution creates an unrepayable debt between him and Salvador's body since that peace is priceless (ll. 3–8), a statement at odds with Silver's claim that the poet's 'debt' to Salvador is

'repaid' in his poetry ('*Arcadia*', p. 122). In the light of Bersani's argument that the son's feces are a gift with which he attempts to compensate his father (p. 110), Luis's statement indicates that he cannot dissolve himself without Salvador's body/penis which gives him (Luis) the invaluable experience of self-shattering. In this situation, value has been transferred from Salvador's body to Luis's experience given that the valuable object or gift is no longer Salvador's body/penis (as it was in '*Viviendo sueños*') but the experience which Luis has by virtue of it. Nevertheless, despite this transfer, Luis's identification with the son's position continues because value is involved in both cases. Consequently, Luis modulates his identification with the father's sadism by identifying with Salvador's compassionate self-offering.

In '*El amante espera*' (pp. 473-74), the men's relationship has finished and Luis appeals to God to act compassionately.<sup>42</sup> Lest we interpret God's compassion in a non-sexual way, it is important to remember that Luis describes it as the object of his love (ll. 6-8). In the first stanza, Luis implores God to restore Salvador to him as He has done previously with other love-objects which he has lost (ll. 1-5). While God's omnipotence is the obvious reason why He should be able to do this, I want to propose a second reason which refers to the fantasy that would motivate such an action: God would restore Salvador to Luis because He identifies with the son's position in the Wolf Man's primal scene, an identification that would imply the modulation of His sadism. Luis's belief that God's compassion would restore Salvador to him points to the possibility of such an identification/modulation. However, although this new, homosexualized, paternal identity is implied (God has helped Luis before) and foreshadowed (Luis hopes He will help him again), it is not realized in this poem.

Luis describes his relationship with Salvador as one which brought him companionship and wealth and exempted his (Luis's) past from criticism (ll. 15-19). In an echo of the situation in '*Un hombre con su amor*', the wealth which Luis feels with Salvador is an indication of his identification with the son's compassionate position. Therefore, in as much as it justifies his previous existence, Luis's relationship with Salvador reworks Luis's paternal identification by suspending its castrating and judgemental stance.

Nevertheless, there is an important difference between God's compassion and that of Luis and Salvador's love. Whereas the men's relationship realizes their compassion, God's is still latent (Luis is only appealing to it). In other words, in '*El amante espera*', God occupies the sadistic position He did in '*Divinidad celosa*' and Luis is trying to encourage Him to identify with the son's masochistic pleasures by acting compassionately. In '*El amante espera*', therefore, Luis is at the same stage in his relation to God as he was in his relation to Salvador in '*Salvador*'. God's identification with the desexualized

paternal position as judge/critic is clear from Luis's comment that he knows that to ask God to return Salvador to him is sinful or to request an opportunity to sin (ll. 10–12). However, by the end of the poem, the link between God and the castrating father has weakened, without it being possible to describe Cernuda's God in this poem, as Corcoran Thomas has done, as 'compassionate and forgiving' (p. 187). Having explained that he is appealing to God because his relationship with Salvador exempts his past from criticism, Luis states that he is continuing his appeal because he is sure that, if he is committing blasphemy, God will forgive him (ll. 20–22). By using the conditional 'si', Luis raises the possibility that male homosexual desire is not a sin or blasphemous and, therefore, quietly questions God's authority. The avowal of such a possibility is the consequence of the redefinition of Luis's relation to his paternal identification in his affair with Salvador, a redefinition which opens up the prospect of a shift in God's attitude as well.

### *Sexuality as Perversion*

In this third section, I examine a number of poems from Cernuda's last four books of poetry in the light of the relation between the biological and the sexual spheres which Jean Laplanche describes in his account of the emergence of human sexuality.<sup>43</sup> Laplanche reaches the conclusion that, especially in the second of the *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality*, Freud represents sexuality in its emergence as a perversion of the instincts or self-preservative functions (*Life and Death*, p. 23). The argument that sexuality in its essence perverts the instincts makes it impossible subsequently to claim convincingly that a sexual instinct exists or that a particular form of sexuality or sexual object-choice is natural. In my reading of Cernuda's later poetry, I shall trace the three elements of the perverse relation between the instincts and sexuality which leads to the 'whole of sexuality [...] becoming perversion' (p. 23). I will argue that the love described in Cernuda's poems is specifically sexual—that is, perverse—because it is characterized by the three features which mark all human sexuality: propping, autoerotism, and the erotogenic zone (p. 15). In pursuing this line of argument, I am taking issue with Dollimore's belief, to which I referred earlier, that an understanding of sexual dissidence should never be limited to sexuality (Dollimore, p. 33) since my argument in this section seeks to outline one version of such an understanding of sexual dissidence that disrupts and confounds the normative framework used to disqualify sexual dissidence.

Laplanche argues that Freud's use of the adjective 'anaclitic' in *On Narcissism: An Introduction* to describe a type of object-choice which is based on the object of the self-preservative function is, in fact, a secondary inflection of the notion of anaclisis.<sup>44</sup> This secondary understanding of

analysis has represented propping as an action whereby the subject's sexuality finds support in the object of the self-preservative function. Laplanche's point is not that such leaning does not occur but, rather, that propping is originally a term used to describe the relation between the drive and the instinct in the first phase of the emergence of sexuality.<sup>45</sup> In this first phase, sexual stimulation finds support in a self-preservative function, while, in the second phase of sexuality's emergence, it is separated from the instinct (*Life and Death*, pp. 16–18).

Following Freud in the *Three Essays*, Laplanche illustrates his argument about propping with the example of feeding. According to Laplanche, at the same time as the feeding function achieves satisfaction through nourishment, it is possible to perceive the emergence of a sexual process in which the infant's lips and tongue are stimulated by the nipple and the passage of milk (p. 17). In this phase, Laplanche argues, the sexual process models itself on the function and is almost indistinguishable from it as far as its object, aim and source are concerned.<sup>46</sup> For example, the relation between the instinctual object (the milk) and the sexual object (the breast) is one of 'contiguity': although the two objects are not the same, the breast is treated as a displaced symbol of the milk. (At this stage, the instinctual object has not been lost nor has the breast become a fantasmatic sexual object.) The difficulty of distinguishing drive from instinct is also apparent as regards the aim and the source. Firstly, the alimentary function and the sexual drive share the aim of taking the object (the milk and the breast respectively) inside the body and, secondly, the source (the mouth) is part of the digestive system and an erotogenic zone. Despite these difficulties, the sexual drive's leaning on the feeding function is revealed by the resemblance between orgasm and the infant's 'culminating satisfaction' at the end of feeding. In the second phase of sexuality's emergence, the instinctual object (the milk) is abandoned and the aim and source are detached from ingestion and the digestive system respectively. This separation is accompanied by what Laplanche calls the 'autoerotic turn' which consists, in part, of the sexual object being internalized as a fantasmatic object (pp. 17–20).

A change of aim occurs in parallel with the internalization of the sexual object. The aim of oral sexuality (incorporation) is, according to Laplanche, simultaneously the same as and different from that of feeding (ingestion). The similarity between the two aims lies in the fact that they both involve a taking into the body (of the milk and breast respectively). There are two differences between the aims. The first difference derives from the meanings that are attached to incorporation but not to ingestion, such as 'preserving within oneself, destroying, assimilating' (p. 20). In their dictionary, Laplanche and Pontalis extend this list to include 'obtain[ing] pleasure by making an object

penetrate oneself'.<sup>47</sup> The second difference between the aims is that incorporation includes relations involving parts of the body other than those belonging to the digestive system.<sup>48</sup> As a result of these differences, the relation between the two aims takes the form of an analogical or metaphorical displacement (p. 20). Although incorporation and ingestion are not identical, they are equivalent or analogous since they both involve a taking into the body yet, at the same time, incorporation also displaces or replaces ingestion as an aim because it covers a wider range of meanings and relations than the latter.

According to Laplanche's reading of Freud, the source of sexuality or erotogenic zones corresponds not only to biologically privileged places of stimulation (such as the lips or anus) which 'secrete sexuality' but also to a far greater number of processes. Consequently, not only the sites of oral, anal, urethral, and genital sexuality but also every region of the skin, every organ (including internal organs), every function, and every human activity is a potential source of erotogenicity (p. 21).<sup>49</sup> Following Freud, Laplanche argues that erotogenicity arises when the effect of an activity in the body passes a particular quantitative limit (p. 22). As will become apparent, one of the processes which Laplanche gives as an example of a source of erotogenicity—'affects, notably "painful" affects' (p. 21)—is central to the poems by Cernuda which I will discuss.

The different elements of the relation between the biological and sexual registers that Laplanche traces in the emergence of sexuality are also found in a number of Cernuda's later poems. My analysis of these poems will examine, among other things, the metaphorical displacement of the instinctual aim at its most abstract level, the continuation of biological life. Although, strictly speaking, the aim of an instinct is satisfaction or the appeasing of tension (p. 11) rather than the maintenance of life, such satisfaction is the precondition for the continuation of biological life since the organism would not survive if the tension were not appeased (it would, for example, die of starvation).

The displacement of the instinctual aim can be seen in the poem 'Sombra de mí' (pp. 472–73) from the series *Poemas para un cuerpo*.<sup>50</sup> In this poem, Luis distinguishes between two types of life. While the first type, biological life, is characterized by mortality and the absence or latency of love, the second is the life Luis experiences as a result of the extremes of affect that his love affair with Salvador gives rise to. In the poem's final stanza, Luis states that the aim of his biological life is to attain life through loving Salvador (ll. 22–25) just as, in 'Vereda del cuco' (pp. 375–79), the aim of love is said to be the creation of life (ll. 92–99).<sup>51</sup> In other words, for Luis in 'Sombra de mí', the purpose of his biological life is to live in a register (love) different

from that of biological life. I disagree in this respect both with Harris, for whom love, in this poem, is the 'life-force itself' rather than the 'object [aim] of life' (p. 144), and with Jiménez-Fajardo, who argues that Salvador is the 'aim and purpose' of Cernuda's life (p. 128). Luis's non-biological aim of love represents the analogical displacement of the implicit aim of biological life (survival). The two aims are analogous since they both involve living but the amorous aim replaces the biological aim because the former covers a type of relations, emotional relations, that are not essential to the process of physical survival. This analogical displacement is also evident in the contradictory effects produced by the description of Luis's love as his heart in the previous stanza (ll. 16–20). On the one hand, this description suggests that Luis's love attaches itself to the needs of his body while, on the other, the fact that his heart only starts to beat with the arrival of Salvador (ll. 13–20) is an indication of the gap between the biological and the loving spheres. This gap is also highlighted in Luis's statement that he was born to wait for Salvador (l. 22) which indicates that neither man is necessary for the other's biological survival. There is in these contradictory effects a clear echo of Laplanche's argument that sexuality is initially wholly based in the self-preservative functions but is also in the movement that uncouples it from those functions (*Life and Death*, p. 18). As a result, the love between Luis and Salvador in 'Sombra de mí' can properly be described as sexual or as based on the perversion of the self-preservative instincts. The same dual relation between life and love is also evident in 'Fin de la apariencia' (pp. 481–82) where Luis writes that his relationship with Salvador gives him a new life (ll. 11–13) compared with which his life outside love is death-like (ll. 17–21).<sup>32</sup> The love and life borrows its terms from yet also differs from the biological sphere, a point implicit in Harris's (pp. 141–42) and Silver's ('*Arcadia*', p. 79) discussions of the idea of rebirth in this poem and also applicable to the use of the metaphor of rebirth in the final line of 'Vereda del cuco' (l. 113).

The gap between biology and sexuality is also visible in the description of the men's relation in 'Contigo' (p. 478) since there is no literal sense in which Salvador is Luis's country (l. 2), family (l. 4) or life (ll. 8–10).<sup>33</sup> Indeed, the metaphoricity of the description is reinforced by what López Castro calls the 'gastado tópico becqueriano' (p. 94) involving the words 'mi vida' (ll. 8–10) in which Luis appears to mistake his sexual aim for his sexual object. Further evidence of the distance between the men's love and biology is furnished by Luis's statement in 'La vida' (pp. 480–81) that Salvador's presence gives to his existence splendour, pleasure, and beauty (ll. 5–8), while his absence, and the implied absence of love, return him to biology, leaving him with old age, death, and solitude (ll. 9–12).<sup>34</sup> However, in

'Contigo', the borrowing of the terms 'vida' (ll. 8–9) and 'muerte' (l. 5) also points to the leaning of the men's love on the biological sphere. Furthermore, the metaphor of Salvador as Luis's family ('gente', l. 4) is a further indication of the grounding of the men's love in the self-preservative functions: in his discussion of the infant's oral relation to its mother, the 'prototype of every relation of love' (*Three Essays*, p. 222), Freud states that he is also describing the infant's relation to substitutes for its mother's breast (p. 181). Potentially, therefore, any member of the infant's family can fulfill the function of the breast for the infant and it is this possibility which reveals the link between Luis's statement and the biological sphere. Such a leaning of the amorous on the biological is also found in 'Vereda del cuco' where the 'tú's desire is modelled on thirst (see, for example, ll. 34–39, 44–57, 67–71) and in 'Sombra de mí' in Luis's description of his paradisiacal experiences with Salvador as sweet (ll. 9–12).

As I have already stated, in the first phase of sexuality's emergence, the sexual object is the mother's breast (or its substitute) and is a displaced symbol of the milk. In the second moment, when the drive is detached from the function, the object of the function (the milk) is lost and, with it, the drive's first object (the breast). According to Laplanche, the loss of the breast coincides with the stage of autoerotism (*Life and Death*, p. 19), in which the drive achieves satisfaction from the infant's own body rather than from that of another person (Freud, *Three Essays*, p. 181). In order to obtain autoerotic satisfaction, the infant must internalize the satisfaction which it experienced at its mother's breast since, as Freud points out, that satisfaction acts as both the spur to seek further satisfaction and the model of that future satisfaction. Therefore, the loss of the breast is accompanied by the breast's fantasmatic preservation within the infant. This double internalization (of the breast and of satisfaction) means that any subsequent relation to a sexual object implicitly imitates and reactivates the relation to the original, fantasmatic sexual object which came into being with autoerotism.

In the emergence of sexuality, the sexual object is primarily contingent and fantasmatic and only secondarily linked with subjective being (*Life and Death*, pp. 11–12). According to Laplanche, there is a 'priority of satisfaction and of the satisfying action' in the subject's relation to the sexual object, as a result of which the object functions as a means by which the subject obtains sexual satisfaction (p. 12). Laplanche argues that, as a consequence, the 'individuality' of the sexual object is of little importance and that it is only necessary for the object to possess 'certain *traits* which trigger the satisfying action' (p. 12). As will become apparent, the position which Salvador occupies as Luis's sexual object mirrors Laplanche's description of the sexual object.

In 'Para ti, para nadie', the contingency of Salvador's status as Luis's sexual object is evident in the analogy between Luis and the lover who seeks the material traces (l. 8) of a former lover in a photograph or letter (ll. 5-9): Salvador's individuality is less important than his possession of certain traits ('rasgos'; l. 8) which 'trigger the satisfying action' (*Life and Death*, p. 12) in Luis. In the later poem 'Epílogo' (pp. 539-40), Luis himself is precisely such a lover: on contemplating a photograph of Salvador, he rediscovers the image it represents and re-lives their time together (ll. 6-12).<sup>55</sup> Similarly, in 'El amante divaga' (pp. 479-80), Salvador's contingency is made clear when Luis qualifies his reference to his and Salvador's story (l. 7) with the comment that '([m]ejor será decir nada más mía, / Aunque a tu parte queden la ocasión y el motivo)' (l. 8).<sup>56</sup> In clear confirmation of the satisfying action's precedence over subjective being in relation to the sexual object, Salvador's role in the relationship is merely to give Luis an opportunity ('ocasión') and reason ('motivo') to fulfill his metaphorically displaced aim of living or, as Harris puts it, to instigate Cernuda's love (p. 143). The same distribution of roles is found throughout *Poemas para un cuerpo* as well as elsewhere in Cernuda's later poetry. For example, in the poem 'Pasatiempo' (p. 460), the speaker describes a youthful body as a possible pretext in the 'tú's' life (ll. 11-12), while, in 'El amor todavía' (pp. 542-43), the existence of the 'tú's' potential beloved is described as offering the 'tú' a reason (ll. 7-8).<sup>57</sup> Salvador's fantasmatic and contingent status in 'El amante divaga' is reiterated towards the end of the poem when Luis states that he does not mind whether he loves, hates, remembers, or forgets Salvador once their relationship is over: all that matters to him is that Salvador exist (ll. 31-36). However, that this is not a sign of Luis's concern for Salvador's subjective being is shown by the link between his description of Salvador as 'mi infierno y paraíso' (l. 36) and his earlier statement that heaven and hell are human creations which, recalling Luis's amorous aim, instil life into life (ll. 25-28). Therefore, as Luis's heaven and hell, Salvador is apparently a creation produced by Luis in order to satisfy his desire. Luis's reference to the relationship he wishes to have with Salvador after their actual relationship is over (ll. 33-36) underlines Salvador's status as the incorporated object of his desire. In keeping with this, Luis's comment that he can bear forgetting Salvador but not never having known him (l. 30) makes clear that, paradoxically, forgetfulness is another form of incorporation or preservation or, as Harris has put it, that Salvador remains 'part of Cernuda's life' even when he is forgotten (p. 141). The love-object's fantasmatic status is also apparent in 'La ventana' (pp. 383-86) and 'Sombra de mí'. In the former, the speaker claims that the love-object is brought to life by the subject's loving gaze (ll. 45-50), while, in the latter,

Luis states that Salvador seems to be his mental image of love and that he has bestowed Salvador's grace on him (ll. 6–12).<sup>58</sup> However, I would not go as far as Maristany who refers to 'Sombra de mí' to support his argument that, in one strand of Cernuda's love poetry, the beloved is erased, becoming an image of the lover's thought ('*La realidad y el deseo*', p. 46), since, in the first stanza of 'Sombra de mí', Luis clearly differentiates Salvador from his mental image of love (ll. 1–3). In the same vein as Maristany, Silver describes Salvador as essentially an 'objectification of a pristine image of the poet's own childhood self' ('*Arcadia*', p. 79), while Jiménez-Fajardo refers to him as merely the shadow of Cernuda's love (p. 128) and Harris terms him the 'visible image' of Cernuda's desire (p. 143).

Although Luis's relationship with Salvador is implicitly marked by autoerotism, Salvador's image is not an original fantasmatic object. This is made clear in 'Sombra de mí' by the reference to the image which is permanently fixed in Luis's mind (ll. 1–2), the shadow of his love (ll. 3–4). As a consequence of its permanence, this image predates not only the particular men with whom Luis falls in love and who resemble it but also the images of them which Luis subsequently internalizes. In 'La ventana' (ll. 61–63) and 'Vereda del cuco', love is represented as eternal, that is, as always predating the particular object of desire. In the latter, the 'tú' is initially drawn to the path of the title by a desire which originates in previous generations (ll. 16–17), while the speaker describes love, rather than the beloved, as eternal (l. 57) and states that it makes each individual love affair possible since it is revealed/concealed in each affair (ll. 54–56). Similarly, the 'tú's' love is described as one that has existed since time immemorial and is revived in the youthful figures that today tread the path as the 'tú' did before them (ll. 88–113).<sup>59</sup> The lover's relation to the love object in Cernuda's later poetry is, therefore, always implicitly routed through a pre-existing fantasmatic object and, as a result, presupposes the perversion of the self-preservative function by sexuality.

As I have shown earlier in this section and in chapter three respectively, of the four biologically privileged sites of infantile sexual stimulation, the mouth, anus and genitals are central to the organization of sexuality in Cernuda's last four books of poetry.<sup>60</sup> In addition, Cernuda's later poetry articulates a vision of sexuality which extends beyond the boundaries of the erotogenic zones foregrounded by biology and, therefore, points to a reorganization of sexual pleasure. As I have shown, according to Laplanche, every area of the skin, every bodily organ and function as well as every human activity can potentially act as an erotogenic zone and does so when the quantity of stimulation to which it is subject passes a certain limit (pp. 21–22).

'Despedida' (p. 470) is an important poem in this respect because it describes two lovers separating in terms of skin breaking.<sup>61</sup> The speaker describes the two men as having been one and compares the 'tú's leaving to the act of undressing (ll. 11–12). However, this comparison is complicated by the speaker's statement that night entered the 'tú' after he had broken with his lover (l. 9) since this implies that the 'tú's lover was, in fact, a skin that the 'tú' has shed.<sup>62</sup> It is hard to imagine a more painful experience. At the same time, in the light of Laplanche's argument that painful emotions and sensations in particular can give rise to sexual excitation (p. 21), such an event leads to the erotogenization of the 'tú's soul (in lines five to eight, the speaker had equated the 'tú' with the soul). The night's entry into the 'tú' can also be seen as pleasurable given that one of the meanings of incorporation is that of 'obtain[ing] pleasure by making the object penetrate oneself' (*Language of Psycho-Analysis*, p. 212). The tú's loss of his skin and the night's entry into him suggest that he has become a hole, a transformation that is reminiscent of Laplanche's description of the child's erotogenic zones as a 'kind of breaking or turning point within the bodily envelope' (*Life and Death*, p. 23). The 'tú' has, therefore, in effect become an extended and erotogenized orifice.

That the two men in 'Despedida' were one and that the 'tú's lover was the 'tú's skin suggests that, in part, incorporation occurred in their relationship at the level of the skin, a process which, as I have stated, is one of the possible consequences of the metaphorical displacement of the instinctual aim. In keeping with the extended range of relations made possible by that metaphorical displacement, the speaker in 'El amor todavía' links the satisfaction of the 'tú's love through the creation of a lover with the process of visual incorporation (ll. 27–28). In keeping with this sexualization of the instinct, the aim of this act of visual incorporation is described as nourishment just as, in lines nine to ten of 'Lo que al amor le basta' (pp. 543–44), the metaphor of nourishment is equated with the first, visual stage of love.<sup>63</sup>

The description of Luis's love in terms of paradise and hell is a sign of its affective intensity. For example, in 'Sombra de mí', addressing Salvador, Luis states that Salvador has the capacity both to make him suffer, cry and abandon all hope and to raise him to ecstatic heights (ll. 6–12). In the same vein, in 'El amante divaga', Luis describes Salvador as his hell and paradise (l. 36), while, in 'Vereda del cuco', the 'tú' experiences love as a divine torment and pleasure (ll. 68–69) and not, as Jiménez-Fajardo claims (p. 95), solely as a 'delight'. It is not difficult to see that the hellish moments of Luis's love for Salvador correspond to those painful affects which, as I have noted, can function as sources of sexuality. In keeping with this extension of

erotogenicity, Luis describes these hellish experiences in 'Sombra de mí' as moving him to tears (ll. 6–8), a description which posits his eyes as sources of sexual excitation. To the same effect, in 'La ventana', love is described as beginning in the lover's eyes (l. 41). That Luis's paradisiacal experiences with Salvador also contribute to the extension of erotogenicity is suggested in 'El amante divaga' not only by the extremity of the noun 'paraíso' (l. 36) but also by Luis's reference to the 'desmesura' of life's precious moments (ll. 3–4). According to such a description, the experience of paradise is violent and exaggerated. As a result, it is a further source of (painful) affects which exceed a particular limit and give rise to erotogenicity. According to Freud, 'terrifying' affects are another of the processes that can act as sources of sexual excitation (*Three Essays*, p. 203). That such terrifying feelings accompany both the hellish and the paradisiacal moments of the men's relationship is suggested by the violence of those experiences, while, in 'Despedida', the 'tú's' act of ending the affair is described as inducing a fear of freedom (ll. 5–8), which posits the end of the men's affair as, paradoxically, a source of pleasure.

The representation of male homosexual desire in Cernuda's later poetry in terms of propping, autoerotism, and erotogenic zones testifies to the irreducibly sexual nature of that desire and, therefore, to the perversion of the instincts upon which it and, indeed, all forms of human sexuality are founded. Such a perverse foundation has two principal effects. On the one hand, it frustrates any attempt to naturalize sexual identity or sexual object-choice by destroying the notion of a sexual instinct while, on the other, as the plurality of erotogenic zones in Cernuda's last four books of poetry suggests, it opens up the possibility of new organizations of sexual pleasure.

#### NOTES

1. Jonathan Dollimore, *Sexual Dissidence: Augustine to Wilde, Freud to Foucault* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991).
2. For another discussion of the relation between essentialism and anti-essentialism, see Fuss, *Essentially Speaking: Feminism, Nature, and Difference*.
3. For further discussion of the natural/unnatural opposition, see Dollimore, pp. 43–55, 108–16, 300–06.
4. See Dollimore's account of the pre-sexological and sexological histories of perversion, pp. 103–230.
5. Dollimore also discusses the perverse dynamic on pp. 228–30.
6. For other readings of this poem, see Olivio Jiménez, 'Emoción', pp. 119–20, 138–39; Coleman, pp. 55–58, 161–62; Harris, pp. 132, 152, 154, 158–59; and Jiménez-Fajardo, pp. 84–85.
7. Similarly, in 'El sino' (p. 398), a rose is the model for the 'tú's' experiences of love. For another reading of this poem, see Ruiz Silva, p. 129.
8. For Harris, the command to learn 'ese silencio' (l. 44) echoes a passage from the 'Epístola moral a Fabio' (pp. 158–59).

9. For other readings of this poem, see Harris, p. 135; and Jiménez-Fajardo, p. 124.
10. Although no love-object is referred to in this poem, 'El fuego' is the last in the series 'Cuatro poemas a una sombra' (pp. 383–91), in which love occurs between men. For other readings of this poem, see Olivio Jiménez, 'Emoción', p. 132; Harris, p. 129; Silver, 'Poeta ontológico', p. 210; and Jiménez-Fajardo, pp. 97, 100.
11. For other readings of this poem, see Silver, 'Arcadia', p. 113; Harris, p. 71; and López Castro, p. 86. Silver has also noted that the arrival of Spring and the resurgence of desire coincide in 'Ofrenda' ('Arcadia', p. 113).
12. Although no love-object is specified in 'Haciéndose tarde', it forms part of the series '*Poemas para un cuerpo*' (pp. 469–85), in which the lovers are male. For other readings of 'Haciéndose tarde', see Silver, 'Arcadia', p. 121; Harris, p. 142; and Jiménez-Fajardo, p. 129.
13. For other readings of this poem, see Harris, pp. 146, 152–53, 155–56; Talens, pp. 276–77; Jiménez-Fajardo, pp. 70–71, 80–83; Allen, p. 67; Pato, pp. 58, 65–66; Ugarte, pp. 184–85; Sahuquillo, pp. 55–57; and Corcoran Thomas, pp. 191–98.
14. Sahuquillo (pp. 55–57) also understands the 'tú' in 'La familia' to be homosexual.
15. For other readings of 'El amigo', see Olivio Jiménez, 'Emoción', pp. 149–50; Silver, 'Arcadia', p. 117; Coleman, pp. 167–69; and Ruiz Silva, pp. 124–25.
16. A further indication of the proximity of male homosexuality to reproductive heterosexuality is found in the description of a male homosexual 'tú's relation with his youth in 'La sombra' (pp. 415–16): the 'tú's inability to accustom himself to having lost his youth and his continued invocation of it (ll. 5–9) are accompanied by his failure to learn from his experience (ll. 10–12), while, at the same time, his youthful consciousness has, in the present, become an 'inconsciencia' (l. 14). For other readings of this poem, see Silver, 'Arcadia', pp. 64–65; Harris, pp. 136–37; Jiménez-Fajardo, p. 103; Ruiz Silva, pp. 123–24; and Allen, pp. 64–65, 73–74.
17. For other readings of this poem, see Harris, pp. 173–74; Olivio Jiménez, '*Desolación*', pp. 332–33; Villena, p. 54; and López Castro, p. 98.
18. For other readings of this poem, see Silver, 'Arcadia', p. 118; Harris, p. 133; Talens, pp. 124–25; and Jiménez-Fajardo, pp. 99–100.
19. For other readings of 'Otra fecha', see Harris, p. 93; Ruiz Silva, p. 141; and Maristany, '*La realidad y el deseo*', p. 85.
20. For other readings of 'El viajero', see Silver, 'Arcadia', pp. 77–78, 80; Harris, pp. 93–94; and Jiménez-Fajardo, pp. 116–17.
21. For other readings of this poem, see Silver, 'Arcadia', pp. 171–72; Harris, pp. 114–15, 133, 155; Maristany, 'La poesía', p. 200; Jiménez-Fajardo, pp. 73–74; Ruiz Silva, p. 104; and Ugarte, pp. 168–69.
22. Other critics who have interpreted the 'tú's sexual identity as homosexual include Harris (pp. 115, 133, 155), Jiménez-Fajardo (p. 73), and Ugarte (p. 169).
23. In his analysis of 'Aplauso humano', Ugarte describes what is implicitly the process of transgressive reinscription in relation to male homosexuality. He writes that '[t]he poet's need to transgress [...] marks itself constantly [...] What in the eyes of the "herd" is deviant and repugnant becomes virtuous in the eyes and words of the poet' (pp. 168–69).
24. For other readings of this poem, see Olivio Jiménez, 'Emoción', pp. 120–22, 131–32; Harris, pp. 146–47, 164–65; Talens, pp. 133–36, 242–44, 290–91, 345–46; Gonzalo Sobejano, 'Alcances de la descripción estilística (Luis Cernuda: "Nocturno yanqui")', in *The Analysis of Hispanic Texts: Current Trends in Methodology*, ed. by Mary Ann Beck and others (New York: Bilingual Press/Editorial bilingüe, 1976), pp. 89–112; Maristany, 'La poesía', pp. 200, 201–02; and Ruiz Silva, pp. 140–41.

25. A similar detour to identity through identification is found in 'El éxtasis' (pp. 405–06; ll. 10–14). For other readings of this poem, see Silver, 'Arcadia', pp. 118–19; and Jiménez-Fajardo, p. 101.
26. A similar perversion is also implicit in the speaker's statement that it is true (l. 95) that the 'tú' struggled as a result of fate and love (ll. 96–97).
27. For other readings of this poem, see Otero, 'Tercera salida', pp. 165–66; and Ruiz Silva, p. 108.
28. Leo Bersani, 'The Gay Daddy', in *Homos* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), pp. 77–112. This essay, and *Homos* in general, has many links with Bersani's earlier essay 'Is the Rectum a Grave?', in *AIDS: Cultural Analysis, Cultural Activism*, ed. by Douglas Crimp (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1988), pp. 197–222. Unless otherwise specified, all future page references will be to 'The Gay Daddy'.
29. Freud's *Three Essays* are in *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, ed. by James Strachey, trans. by James Strachey and others, 24 vols (London: The Hogarth Press and The Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1953–74), VII (1953; repr. 1964), 130–243. I will give future page references to Freud's *Three Essays* in the text.
30. Leo Bersani, *The Freudian Body: Psychoanalysis and Art* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986).
31. For an overview of psychoanalytic accounts of male homosexuality, see Kenneth Lewes, *The Psychoanalytic Theory of Male Homosexuality* (London: Quartet Books, 1989). The Wolf Man case-history is found in Sigmund Freud, 'From the History of an Infantile Neurosis', in *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, XVII (1955; repr. 1964), pp. 7–122.
32. In *The History of Sexuality: An Introduction*, Foucault argues that '[w]here there is power, there is resistance, and [...] consequently, this resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power' (p. 95).
33. For other readings of 'Para ti, para nadie', see Harris, pp. 140–41, 145; and Jiménez-Fajardo, pp. 126–27. José Romera Castillo articulates his views in 'Autobiografía de Luis Cernuda: aspectos literarios', in *L'Autobiographie en Espagne: Actes du IIème colloque international de la Baume-les-Aix, 23–24–25 Mai 1981*, *Études hispaniques*, 5 (Aix-en-Provence: Université de Provence, 1982), pp. 279–94 (pp. 288–90).
34. For other readings of this poem, see Silver, 'Arcadia', p. 120; Harris, p. 83; and Jiménez-Fajardo, pp. 125–26.
35. For other readings of 'Amor en música', see Otero, 'Tercera salida', p. 165; Harris, p. 139; and Sahuquillo, pp. 339–41.
36. For other readings of 'Precio de un cuerpo', see Otero, 'Tercera salida', pp. 169–70; Harris, p. 143; and Sahuquillo, pp. 224–25.
37. For other readings of 'De dónde vienes', see Silver, 'Arcadia', p. 45; and Harris, pp. 141, 142–43.
38. For other readings of this poem, see Silver, 'Arcadia', p. 122; Otero, 'Tercera salida', pp. 167–68; Jiménez-Fajardo, p. 130; and Ruiz Silva, p. 138.
39. For another reading of this poem, see López Castro, p. 94.
40. For other readings of this poem, see Jiménez-Fajardo, p. 128; and Martínez Cuitiño, p. 140.
41. For other readings of this poem, see Silver, 'Arcadia', p. 122; Harris, pp. 144–45; Talens, pp. 138–39, 279–80; Ruiz Silva, pp. 139–40; and Sahuquillo, pp. 224–25.
42. For other readings of this poem, see Harris, p. 83; and Corcoran Thomas, pp. 187–88.
43. Jean Laplanche, *Life and Death in Psychoanalysis*, trans. by Jeffrey Mehlman (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), pp. 8–24.

44. Laplanche uses the term 'propping' instead of 'anaclysis' to translate the German 'Anlehnung' (*Life and Death*, pp. 15–16). The passage from Freud to which Laplanche is referring can be found in 'On Narcissism: An Introduction', in *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, 24 vols, XIV (1957; repr. 1964), pp. 73–102 (p. 87).
45. This point was made previously by James Strachey in a footnote to Freud's 'On Narcissism' (p. 87, fn. 2).
46. For a discussion of the four elements (impetus, aim, object, and source) which compose the substratum common to drives and instincts, see *Life and Death*, pp. 10–14.
47. J. Laplanche and J.-B. Pontalis, *The Language of Psycho-Analysis*, trans. by Donald Nicholson-Smith (London: The Hogarth Press and The Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1973), pp. 211–12 (p. 212).
48. In the entry under 'Incorporation' in *The Language of Psycho-Analysis*, Laplanche and Pontalis list incorporation through respiration, the skin, sight, and hearing as well as anal and genital incorporation (p. 212).
49. For Bersani, Freud's extension of erotogenicity in the *Three Essays* was the first significant attempt to uncouple pleasure from genitality and, thereby, to 'dissolv[e] the whole notion of sex in a reorganization of bodily pleasures' (*Homos*, p. 98).
50. For other readings of this poem, see Silver, 'Arcadia', pp. 79, 121; Harris, pp. 143–44; Jiménez-Fajardo, p. 128; and Maristany, 'La realidad y el deseo', p. 46.
51. For other readings of 'Vereda del cuco', see Silver, 'Arcadia', pp. 114–16; Coleman, pp. 162–64; Harris, pp. 125–27, 146; Talens, pp. 121–22, 203, 245, 277–79, 345–46; Jiménez-Fajardo, pp. 92–95; Bruton, 'Exile Poetry', p. 392; and Quirarte, pp. 97–98.
52. For other readings of this poem, see Olivio Jiménez, 'Emoción', pp. 145–46; Silver, 'Arcadia', p. 79; Harris, pp. 141–42; and López Castro, p. 94.
53. For other readings of this poem, see Harris, p. 141; and Jiménez-Fajardo, p. 128.
54. For other readings of 'La vida', see Harris, p. 141; and Jiménez-Fajardo, p. 129.
55. For other readings of this poem, see Jiménez-Fajardo, pp. 134–35; Villena, p. 55; and López Castro, p. 98.
56. For other readings of this poem, see Otero, 'Tercera salida', pp. 167–68; Harris, pp. 141, 143; and Jiménez-Fajardo, p. 130.
57. For other readings of 'Pasatiempo', see Silver, 'Arcadia', pp. 119–20; Harris, p. 139; and Jiménez-Fajardo, pp. 123–24. For other readings of 'El amor todavía', see Olivio Jiménez, 'Desolación', p. 331; Jiménez-Fajardo, p. 136; Villena, pp. 54–55; and Allen, p. 72.
58. For other readings of 'La ventana', see Olivio Jiménez, 'Emoción', p. 145; Silver, 'Arcadia', pp. 116–17; Coleman, pp. 166–67; Harris, pp. 128–30; Jiménez-Fajardo, pp. 98–99; and Sánchez Rosillo, pp. 159–61.
59. Other critics who have highlighted love's eternal character in this poem include Silver, 'Arcadia', p. 114; Harris, pp. 126, 127; and Quirarte, p. 97.
60. This list of biologically privileged sites of sexual excitation is taken from *Life and Death in Psychoanalysis* (p. 21). Sexual stimulation of the urethra plays no part in the representation of sexuality in Cernuda's later poetry.
61. For another reading of this poem, see Silver, 'Arcadia', p. 120.
62. For his part, Silver equates the lover with the 'tú's body' ('Arcadia', p. 120).
63. For other readings of 'Lo que al amor le basta', see Harris, p. 170; Olivio Jiménez, 'Desolación', p. 331; and Villena, pp. 54–55.