CHAPTER 1

A MYTHOLOGY OF FREEDOM

In this chapter, I examine the connections between Cernuda's poetry and the two functions Friedrich Schlegel attributed to mythology in order to argue that Cernuda's later poetry creates a collectively valid mythology of freedom that seeks to bring about change in the then contemporary historical present. Given the Absolute's importance to Schlegel's discussion of mythology and to the texts by Cernuda that I discuss in this chapter, I shall start by giving a brief outline of its nature and place in early Romantic philosophy.

Andrew Bowie has argued that, in early Romantic philosophy, the Absolute was an infinite totality constituted by the identity of the subject of natural necessity (of the subject as an object of knowledge) with the subject of freedom (of the subject as a moral subject outside the realm of necessity).[1] According to Bowie, in this infinite totality were united the purposes which guided the subject's 'free moral action' and the 'overall purpose of nature' embodied in the subject as a natural being (p. 42), an 'overall purpose' not inherent in nature itself but, rather, assumed by the moral subject (p. 24). This totality, which had to be of a different status from the diverse elements within it in order to transform their difference into a higher identity, was only possible if the finite aspect of existence was overcome. As a result of the unity of freedom and nature, each 'passing, sensuous moment' ceased to be part of an 'endless chain or a random sequence' and became meaningful (p. 42). According to Bowie, early Romantic philosophy held that the understanding could only 'dissect reality' and that what could 'reassemble' reality, the Absolute or infinite, was indemonstrable and only present as a 'sense of loss' (p. 43). Nevertheless, Romantic philosophy attempted to grasp the 'sense of reality as a whole' through the desire to see it in the sensuous, a desire that expressed itself in '"longing"' (p. 43).

As a result of the impossibility of achieving knowledge of the Absolute through philosophical reflection, Romantic art became concerned with representing the unrepresentable, the Absolute.[2] An important part of the early Romantic understanding of art was '"aesthetic reduction"' or the '"reduction of the time of the philosophy of history to an ecstatic moment"'.[3] According to Bowie, an influential way of achieving such reduction was Friedrich Schlegel's notion of '"humour"' or the ability to create correspondences which suggested an 'essential unity of totally diverse phenomena, and thus of the whole world' (p. 53). However, this ecstatic moment, in which the Absolute was embodied in sensuous form, was characterized by 'randomness, suddenness, and transience' (p. 53).

It was from within the context of the Absolute's unrepresentability that Schlegel's work on mythology emerged (Bowie, pp. 53–54). In 1800, Schlegel published his 'Talk on Mythology' as part of his *Dialogue on Poetry* in the Romantic journal *Athenaeum*.[4] In Schlegel's view, the deficiency of the then contemporary art stemmed from its lack of a centre, which meant that a poet had to create his own mythology 'like a new creation out of nothing' (p. 81) each time he wrote. As a response to this situation, Schlegel proposed his new mythology—the collective production of a centre of collectively binding images and symbols on which the then contemporary art could draw (Bowie, p. 54).

Whereas, according to Schlegel, ancient Greek mythology 'directly join[ed] and imitat[ed]' the 'most immediate and vital' aspects of the 'sensuous world' (pp. 81–82), his new mythology was to be produced through freedom, from the 'deepest depths of the spirit' (p. 82), and would be the 'hieroglyphic expression' of a natural world transfigured by 'imagination and love' (p. 85) and a 'free art of ideas [...] created by nature' (p. 86).[5] According to Schlegel, mythology could not exist without 'something original and inimitable which is absolutely irreducible' whose 'original character and creative energy are still dimly visible' even after 'all the transformations' (p. 86). In mythology's 'absolutely irreducible' source, opposites were reconciled or, as Schlegel puts it, 'profundity permits the semblance of the absurd and of madness, of simplicity and foolishness, to shimmer through' (p. 86). For Schlegel, the uniting of opposites was synonymous with cancelling the 'progression and laws of rationally thinking reason' and had the effect of transporting us back into the 'beautiful confusion of imagination, into the original chaos of human nature' (p. 86). The key term here is 'imagination' or 'productive imagination', which was the highest principle of Schlegel's thought[6] and took precedence over reflection (Bullock, pp. 91–93).[7] In giving priority to productive imagination, Bullock argues, Schlegel emphasized the 'absolute thesis' according to which the I 'posits itself by a pure act—absolutely primitive, without antecedent or derivation—and away from the subsequent positing of *Nicht-Ich* in the reflexive succession that generates the concept of world' (Bullock, p. 91). Consequently, it was in the mode of thought represented by productive imagination that the subject's freedom was most fully realized.

In his 'Talk on Mythology', as Bowie has also indicated (p. 53), Schlegel argued that mythology fulfilled two, contradictory functions.[8] On the one hand, the structure of mythology gave real form to the sublime, to that which marked the failure to represent the Absolute but simultaneously invoked the infinite through the experience of that failure.[9] On the other hand, however, Schlegel also argued that poetry which manifested 'humour' and mythology

were both organized according to an 'artfully ordered confusion' or 'charming symmetry of contradictions' ('Talk on Mythology', p. 86). As a result, mythology was another means of creating an 'essential unity' out of diverse phenomena (p. 82) which enabled the reader to experience the union of the finite and the infinite. Indeed, for Schlegel, mythology's 'great advantage' was that, in it, 'what usually escapes our consciousness' could be 'perceived and held fast through the senses and spirit like the soul in the body surrounding it' (p. 85).

Many of the points I have mentioned in the last few pages are found in Cernuda's later poetry. In 'Mozart', for example, just as, for Schlegel, the subject was identified with the Absolute, so Mozart is identified with music (l. 3) and music with the Absolute, with that which is untouchable and invisible (l. 4) yet audible (ll. 5–6).[10] The unity of matter and spirit in the figure of Mozart is also found in the description of the composer as a simultaneously human and divine voice (ll. 57–58). In keeping with Schlegel's argument that mythology can represent the Absolute, the speaker states that the architecture (l. 32) of Mozart's music:

> Formas líquidas
> Da de esplendor inexplicable, y así traza
> Vergeles encantados, mágicos alcázares,
> Fluidos bajo un frío rielar de estrellas.
> (l. 32)

In these lines, Mozart's music creates magical spaces and objects in which time and eternity, finitude and freedom, coexist (ll. 34–35), an effect that justifies critics' inclusion of 'Mozart' in their discussions of poetry's unifying function (see, for example, Silver, '*Arcadia*', pp. 180–81; Harris, p. 172; and Jiménez-Fajardo, p. 138). In other words, Mozart's music gives the listener access to the Absolute or a 'transcendent reality' (Harris, p. 173) and, therefore, fulfills one of the functions of Schlegel's new mythology. In the same vein, Mozart's music unifies a series of contradictions (ll. 30–31 and 37–38), is said to awaken the lost dreams of a transcendental identity (ll. 59–60) and, in as much as it knows passion's power and eternal failure (ll. 41–42), to transcend passion. A little earlier in the poem, the suddenness of the moment of aesthetic reduction was suggested by the description of the theme and development of Mozart's music as wings (ll. 23–24) which open suddenly in music (l. 28) to another, more glorious firmament (ll. 26–27), whose freshness (l. 27) recalls the description of the Absolute in line six. Just as Schlegel privileged productive imagination over rational reflection and sought to cancel the 'progression and laws of rationally thinking reason' ('Talk on Mythology', p. 86) in his new mythology, so, in 'Mozart', Mozart's

music is described as placing reason in the service of imagination (ll. 29–30). Finally, and in keeping with the non-rational experience of the Absolute, the liquid forms (l. 32) that Mozart's music produces are characterized as incomprehensibly or indescribably splendid (l. 33).

The speaker in 'El poeta' (pp. 403–05) also links poetry and the Absolute in his statement that the poet is concerned with the unknowable unity of spirit and nature, the mysterious and divine image of things (ll. 20–21), a unity produced by the poet.[11] According to the speaker, the 'tú' learnt from Jiménez how to:

> Mirar quieto, como
> Espejo, sin el cual la creación sería
> Ciega, hasta hallar su mirada en el poeta.
> (l. 22)

In these lines, the poet reflects nature and thereby causes nature to recognize itself in him. However, it is only possible for the poet to transform nature, to bring it out of unconsciousness to self-consciousness, if he exceeds nature, that is, if he is also free.[12] In keeping with the Absolute's rational unknowability, the speaker states that Jiménez's poetry infuses (l. 16) the reader with faith or the magical certainty of the visible and invisible world (ll. 17–18), just as, in 'Mozart', the creation of the Absolute and magic were simultaneous (ll. 33–34). As a result of Schlegel's definition of faith as an act of freedom,[13] the Absolute in Cernuda's later poetry can be said to be perceived through the exercise of the subject's freedom rather than through the laws of science. In keeping with this, in 'Río vespertino' (pp. 371–74), a description of the poet's task as the perception of the Absolute (ll. 20–21) is combined with a preference for silence (ll. 81–84).[14] Although in 'Río vespertino', faith is described as contrary to reason (l. 79) and as thought's reassuring shadow (l. 80), the description of the Absolute as 'aquella cosa [...]/De cuya fe conocimiento viene' (ll. 73, 74) suggests that faith also makes knowledge possible.[15] It is, therefore, not a question of choosing between knowledge and faith but of acknowledging their interdependence. Such potential interdependence is suggested in 'Tarde oscura' (pp. 337–38) by the 'tú''s search for faith in thought (ll. 25–27) as a way of counteracting Man's useless destiny (ll. 23–24) while, in 'Otras ruinas' (pp. 401–03; ll. 41–48), the separation of knowledge and faith is diagnosed as a trait of the then contemporary present and attacked.[16]

In 'Las edades' (pp. 412–14), a third-person narrator evokes a group of statues of animal gods in a museum and reflects on the place of the divine in human culture past and present.[17] As natural/animal gods, the statues that the narrator describes are examples of the Absolute and, consequently, the

description of the statues is also a description of the Absolute's status in the present. In the narrator's opinion, as museum exhibits, the statues are out-of-place (l. 1), powerless, purely decorative (ll. 33–35), and subject, like humanity, to the destructions of time and chance (ll. 45–47), a vulnerability that is echoed in 'Otras ruinas' (l. 16), which depicts a form of life linked with humanity's forgetting of its gods (Jiménez-Fajardo, p. 111), and that is described as intolerable in 'Noche del hombre y su demonio' (pp. 366–70; ll. 60–61).[18] In their rightful place, the statues of 'Las edades' were eternal and reflected their subjects' experience of the divine (ll. 9–10), an interdependence also noted by Jiménez-Fajardo (p. 111) and echoed in 'Noche del hombre y su demonio' (ll. 17–18). In the past, the gods of 'Las edades' bound their subjects' different activities together into a living unity whose destruction or fragmentation introduced a desire for death (l. 32) into the culture (ll. 29–32). In keeping with the Absolute's incarnation, the life of the people (l. 9) over whom the gods presided (l. 13) was one that was comprehended through myth (ll. 23–24) and in which the visible was created with the invisible (ll. 20–21).

However, why should 'Las edades' be considered mythological? Firstly, because the poem is the material product of the narrator's freedom and, as such, reconciles freedom and necessity. Evidence that the poem was written through the exercise of freedom is provided by the description of the statues as summoned by dreams (l. 5) since, in the past, the visible was created with the invisible and acts with dreams (ll. 20–21). The narrator, therefore, creates the poem (the visible/an act) by drawing on his freedom (the invisible/a dream). Secondly, 'Las edades' can be seen as mythical because the earlier culture it describes was a living example of the Absolute. The third link between the poem and myth stems from the sublimity of the present for the poet, a sublimity that derives from the contrast between a present unable to perceive the Absolute and the narrator's awareness of that failure (e.g. his sadness in line one), which results from his continued exercise of his freedom. It is because of his ongoing use of his freedom that the narrator can describe the statues as the traces of a god that existed and demands to exist always (l. 54). Consequently, the difference between the past and the present derives not from the presence or absence of the intuition of divinity (l. 17) but, rather, from the use or renunciation of that intuition. It is the foundation of the poet's identity in freedom that makes possible his description in 'Río vespertino' as the so-called herd's insistent conscience (ll. 12–16) and, in 'Noche del hombre y su demonio', as feeling 'por otros la conciencia/ Aletargada en ellos, con su remordimiento' (l. 80).[19] Both these definitions also presuppose the then contemporary society's continuing but negative relation to freedom as the ground of morality and explain the poet's then

contemporary marginalization, a recurrent theme in 'Río vespertino' (e.g. ll. 16–21, 30–32, 37–43 and 81–82) that Maximino Cacheiro has also noted (p. 57). This continuing relationship provides the hope for the successful realization of the poet's project of generating freedom in history. Without modern society's negative relation to freedom, the speaker's purpose would be utterly unrealizable.

'Retrato de poeta' (pp. 450–53) is another poem that can be interpreted as mythological for the same reasons as 'Las edades'.[20] For the poem's nostalgic speaker, the life of Fray Hortensio Paravicino exemplified a unity of the visible and the invisible since it was sustained by his faith in things that were invisible or only spiritually perceptible (ll. 33–38). In this sense, Paravicino is an example of the generations in 'Río vespertino' who 'labraron con fe lo no creído' (l. 76) and were sure in their faith, which had no need of the visible (ll. 77–78). In a parallel of 'Las edades', the visible is also created with the invisible in 'Retrato de poeta'. As Antonio Monegal has shown, the majority of the images described in the poem as belonging to the portrait of Fray Paravicino do not, in fact, feature in it (p. 70). Rather, the speaker supplements his description of what he sees with inventions, just as invention and description are combined in 'Otras ruinas' (ll. 9–32). The portrait, which Monegal reproduces on page sixty-six of his article, is described in most detail in the following lines:

Quietamente
Sentado ahí, en dejadez airosa,
La mano delicada marcando con un dedo
El pasaje en el libro, erguido como a escucha
Del coloquio un momento interrumpido,
Miras tu mundo y en tu mundo vives.
(l. 65)

However, even here, the phrase 'en dejadez airosa' (l. 66) points to the speaker's interpretation of the painting, while line sixty-nine refers to a conversation not included in the painting. In the same vein, the mention of Paravicino's world (l. 70) refers back to the detailed, but entirely imaginary, description of his world (ll. 12–23). Finally, again as in 'Las edades', that the speaker in 'Retrato de poeta' is able to diagnose the present's failure to represent the Absolute, implied by the present's lack of faith (l. 46), because he continues to exercise his freedom is shown by his statement that, through Paravicino, he can hear the 'dejo adormecido/ Queriendo resurgir' of that which can only be perceived spiritually (ll. 41–43). In a similar vein, in 'Otras ruinas' the ruined city is described as the gods' last gift to humanity (l. 56).

The characterization of the present in 'Las edades' as an age in which the traces of the past are whimsically owned and exchanged (ll. 34–40) is also found in 'Limbo' (pp. 460–62).[21] In this poem, a description of a 'tú''s experience at an upper-class soiree is combined with a meditation on the cultural fate of the poet's work which testifies to the difficulty of bringing about social change in the present through poetry. The soiree is being held in the house of a dilettante (l. 22) who amuses himself by buying artefacts created from faith in another time and country and who is seated among his spoils next to a second-rate portrait of himself (ll. 17–24). As he moves about the party, the 'tú' overhears another guest saying that they have bought the first edition of an unusual poet (ll. 29–32), a comment which typifies for the 'tú' the indifferent reception to which the poet's work is subject, even centuries after his death (ll. 33–40). That the poet's work and the spoils of the soiree's host suffer the same fate of commodification or 'prostitution' (LaFollette Miller, p. 168) implies that poetry is also a product of faith and, therefore, of freedom. The interweaving of poetry and freedom is confirmed by part of the indifferent reception accorded the poet's work being to treat it like yet another futile object and any other useless ornament (ll. 45–46). Such treatment presupposes poetry's purposiveness or grounding in freedom since, to the contrary, its domestication could not be simultaneous with the subtraction of purpose from it.

In 'A un poeta futuro' (pp. 339–43), the speaker describes the relation of incomprehension between himself and his contemporaries and expresses the hope that, through his addressee (an unborn poet), he will enjoy a plenitude of life that he cannot enjoy while alive.[22] The speaker describes his relation to society as one of attraction and hostility (ll. 1–2) and states that, when writing poetry, his feelings alternate between fear and bravery, failure and hope for success or poetic immortality (ll. 54–66). The coexistence in the poet of these three oppositions makes the speaker in this poem an instance of the Absolute since it echoes Schlegel's argument that, in the Absolute (which he identified with the subject), opposites are united. In the same vein, the speaker has access to both the divine and the human spheres, as is shown by his references to the gods' idea (l. 21), the gods' time (l. 32), our human time (l. 31), and a future in which humanity will be free from the primitive world to which it has returned (l. 84). Similarly, Philip II's identity in 'Silla del rey' (pp. 419–23) is mythological in that it is an instance of the Absolute since, in it, opposites are contained.[23] The King describes himself as a monarch with two aspects on account of his incomparable pride and humility (ll. 34–35) and states that the Escorial records his contradictory being (l. 36) that is exultant at its divinity or inhumanity (l. 37) and humble because it feels itself impossible (l. 38).[24]

As in 'Las edades', the present in 'A un poeta futuro' is characterized by the separation of the divine and the human (ll. 28–33) and is experienced as sublime by the poet in as much as he has an intuitive knowledge of the future when the Absolute will be embodied (ll. 65–68) and predicts that the future will reflect the gods' idea (ll. 18–21). Consequently, given that the poet's identity is an example of the Absolute and that he experiences the present as sublime, a close parallel exists between this poem and Schlegel's contradictory definitions of mythology.

The poem 'El poeta y la bestia' (pp. 518–21) describes the confrontation at a particular historical moment between the figure of the poet (Goethe) and the forces of animality (Napoleon).[25] According to the speaker, the development of Goethe's life and work gives an insight into and balances Goethe's various gifts (ll. 17–19). That such development was simultaneously varied and harmonious posits Goethe's life and work as an instance of the Absolute and, therefore, implies that, as a remembrance of them, this poem is mythological. However, the realized freedom of Goethe's life and work is vulnerable to brute forces (l. 24) moved by Napoleon (l. 60) from afar, a vulnerability exemplified by the description of how close Goethe came to being murdered by the French soldiers billeted in his home (ll. 31–60).[26] The poem's third section (ll. 61–80) is an example of a move which has figured in many of the poems I have discussed so far: the use of history to intervene in history.[27] This use of history is clear in the following lines:

> Napoleón, repetido cuantas veces se quiera, [...]
> Jamás puede valernos
> Lo que un único Goethe. ¿Quién lo ignora?
> Mas hay que recordarlo a los que olvidan,
> A los que todavía en nuestro mundo aclaman
> A la Bestia.
>
> (ll. 61, 62)

Although the speaker's identification with Goethe and against Napoleon is evident in these lines, the strength of his identification does not mean that it is an uncritical one, an ambivalence that Olivio Jiménez ('*Desolación*', pp. 330–31) and Villena (pp. 46, 55–56) both overlook. Indeed, in the poem's final stanza, the speaker expresses his puzzlement at Goethe's continued admiration for Napoleon despite nearly dying at the hands of his troops (ll. 71–78).[28] In the poem's final two-and-a-half lines, the speaker wonders whether Goethe was being arbitrary or just (l. 78) in admiring Napoleon. The critical distance in the speaker's identification with Goethe is indicated by the fact that he does not consider the possibility that Goethe's admiration was justified and, instead, speculates on the reasons for Goethe's

arbitrariness (ll. 79–80). By ending the poem with the possibility that Goethe worshipped Napoleon, the speaker underlines his criticism of Goethe.

As its title suggests, the poem 'Díptico español' is divided into two. The first poem, 'Es lástima que fuera mi tierra' (pp. 501–04), outlines a poet's relation to the then contemporary Fascist Spain, while the second, 'Bien está que fuera tu tierra' (pp. 504–07), puts forward an alternative vision of Spain drawn from Spanish history as compensation and cure for the (then contemporary) present.[29] As this summary makes clear, these poems emerge from and seek to have an impact on history. They exemplify the use of history in and against history in defence of freedom and in the name of principles derived from the generous Cervantine tradition (l. 163).[30] I, therefore, disagree with Harris who argues that 'Díptico español' is essentially about Cernuda's character rather than Spain (p. 169) and with Cano who claims that, in 'Bien está que fuera tu tierra', Cernuda holds on to the Spain of Galdós in order to flee from the Spain of the then contemporary present ('Estela', p. 255).

In 'Es lástima que fuera mi tierra', the historical present provokes a response in the speaker, who believes that humanity's spiritual inheritance is being denied and confiscated in the then contemporary Spain and that, as a result, (Spanish) humanity is descending into animality (ll. 10–19). In contrast, but in an echo of the opposition to animality in 'El poeta y la bestia' that, for Cárdenas, represents the deepest and most radical meaning of the figure of the poet (p. 10), the speaker dedicates himself to the maintenance and transmission of humanity's spiritual patrimony as a result of his faith in the craft of being human (ll. 69–71). Similarly, the narrator in 'Supervivencias tribales en el medio literario' (pp. 517–18) also seeks to resist forms of Spanish culture which, in his eyes, belong to the lower rungs of the ladder separating humans from animals (the 'supervivencias tribales' of the title), a project he shares with the speaker of 'Otra vez, con sentimiento' (p. 511), who refers to the tribe that has seized control of Lorca's life and work since his murder (ll. 3–5).[31] Just as, in 'Río vespertino', the narrator surveys the present and writes that he is surrounded by death (ll. 60–61), so Fascist Spain is described as a nightmarish country of death (ll. 19–21), a situation the speaker diagnoses as the revenge of life on those who have denied it (ll. 28–29), on those who have initiated Spanish history, Spain's leaders (ll. 30–31).[32] There are two points to highlight in this diagnosis: firstly, that the long standing of this deathly tradition and its dominance in the present are caused by human action. And, secondly, that the speaker's criticism is directed primarily at Spain's leaders and, contrary to Gracia Noriega's claim (p. 40), not at the Spanish nation as a whole.

In the next stanza, the speaker turns his attention to the Spanish people whom he describes as lacking reason owing to the operation of political forces on them (l. 36). For the speaker, there is an inexorable line of development from the formation into irrationality of the Spanish people to their obscene cult of slavery in the present (ll. 36–43). Although inexorable, this development was, again, the result of human agency, as is shown by the fact that the Spanish people have been indoctrinated into being hostile to reason. Human activity, therefore, is necessary for history to be made and, implicitly, changed and it is this necessity that inspires the speaker to write since, to the contrary, it would be futile to seek to intervene in history.

As a poet, the speaker writes, he can exchange neither his country nor his language (ll. 49–51) and, indeed, country, language, and poetry are so tightly interwoven that the act of writing poetry appears necessarily to continue the poet's national poetic tradition (ll. 52–58). The only way in which a poet cannot further his country's tradition is by being loyal to his conscience and, as a consequence, to poetry (ll. 59–66). Therefore, the ground for the poet's dissent from the national tradition, whose boundaries poetry exceeds, is his conscience or sense of morality, which is grounded in freedom and indissociable from a capacity to posit purposes. Given that the speaker's activity in this poem is determined by his conscience, freedom can be said to be the ground of his intervention in history just as, in 'El poeta y la bestia', Goethe's life and work were also grounded in freedom. The indissociability of poetry and freedom is indicated by the fact that, for the speaker, to exercise his freedom is to act in accordance with poetry (ll. 64–66).[33]

The inseparability of poetry and freedom is also suggested in the speaker's description of his intended audience as composed of people who listen to him with well-disposed understanding (l. 80) and who respect human freedom or the faculty for self-determination (l. 82), which the speaker describes as the ground of human agency (l. 83) and as directed towards the divine (l. 84), a divine which acts as the cornerstone of free cultural exchange among human beings.[34] The speaker in this poem, therefore, belongs to a community of individuals (albeit a very small one) who exercise their freedom and are, as a result, mythological figures in the way that Goethe was in 'El poeta y la bestia'. In a similar vein, in 'A un poeta futuro', the future union of the divine and the human (the Absolute), which the speaker seeks to help realize through his own poetry, will underpin a poetic community. In stark contrast, the poet's readers in 'Limbo', whose reception of his work subtracts freedom from it (ll. 43–46), conform to prescribed and unchanging forms of social behaviour (ll. 25–28). Art's political potential, its ability to become and

transform historical reality, therefore, depends on the identifications that the reader makes with it.

In 'Bien está que fuera tu tierra', the second poem of 'Díptico español', the speaker constructs a vision of Spain with which to counter that sketched in 'Es lástima que fuera mi tierra'. 'Bien está que fuera tu tierra' also focuses on its addressee's experience as a reader, an experience described as that of wanting art to pass over into historical reality (ll. 113–15). The other Spain (l. 101) outlined in this poem and with which the 'tú' identifies is that represented by and in the novels of Benito Pérez Galdós and is based on the principles of tolerance of difference—or generosity—heroism, and tenacity in the struggle for an appropriate future (ll. 162–65). In this last sense, in 'Bien está que fuera tu tierra', art offers hope for the future (Müller, p. 51). The characterization of this other Spain as the impossible homeland (l. 148) testifies to the gap between its principles and those prevalent in Fascist Spain.

Central to this fictional world are the characters that inhabit it, one of whom, Salvador Monsalud, was a particularly important role model for the 'tú' in his boyhood (ll. 113–121).[35] According to the speaker, in his boyhood, the 'tú' wished that, like Salvador, he would be moved by the devotion and faith that led Monsalud to pursue his goals or purposes (ll. 116–21). By referring to Monsalud's purposes in connection with his pursuit of his 'quimeras desoladas' (ll. 118–20), the speaker indicates that those impossible dreams were grounded in freedom. The central place of freedom in Monsalud's identity is also suggested by the importance of faith to his struggle (l. 121). Monsalud's association with freedom contrasts sharply with the slavery suffered by the Spanish people in 'Es lástima que fuera mi tierra', a contrast underlined by the description of his insistence on freedom as a madness (l. 117). In keeping with this, the speaker of 'Es lástima que fuera tu tierra' suggests that Fascist Spain has no faith (ll. 71–72) and, in 'Río vespertino', describes the then contemporary soul as no longer believing in God (ll. 50–51). Monsalud's freedom also positions him as a predecessor of the small group of individuals mentioned in the first poem of 'Díptico español', while his emphasis on faith establishes him as a bridge back to the generations of 'Río vespertino'.[36] Similarly, an ongoing faith is central to the identity of the ex-Lincoln Brigade soldier in '1936' (ll. 29–31) who, in the face of human baseness and harshness (ll. 2–3), has a compensatory/curative effect on the speaker (ll. 1–5, 33–39) just as Galdós's novels do and can be included in the generous Cervantine tradition to which Fray Paravicino in 'Retrato de poeta' also belongs. Also worthy of inclusion in this tradition is the speaker in 'Supervivencias tribales en el medio literario' (ll. 9–13) given that he attacks what he calls the Spanish idiosyncrasy of concentrating on the excellence of a single writer and denying that excellence 'puede corresponder

a varios' (ll. 17–19). Referring to characters from the first two series of *Episodios Nacionales*, the speaker in 'Bien está que fuera tu tierra' writes that the fictional heroes interwove his life with theirs (ll. 107–08) and were embodiments of freedom to the extent that their commitment to an impossible living dream (l. 112) echoes that of Monsalud to his disconsolate impossible dreams (l. 120). As a result, the 'tú' is liberated by the fictional characters because his identification with them (l. 106) presupposes his use of his own freedom. To different degrees, therefore, both the poems of 'Díptico español' present the reader with sensuous images of freedom and, by doing so, activate his own freedom. Consequently, these poems suggest that art can be the medium for a political engagement in history which takes place through the reader's exercise of his freedom.

The impossibility of extricating 'Díptico español' from history is reiterated in the last stanza of 'Bien está que fuera tu tierra' (ll. 167–71) where the speaker describes the effects of the other Spain as being to compensate him and his addressee for the obscenity and degradation of Spain's then contemporary political situation and to cure it (l. 171). The use of the medical metaphor of curing recalls the speaker's description of Spain's leaders in 'Es lástima que fuera mi tierra' as the infected enemies of life (l. 31) and serves as a reminder that his attack is against those who wield and have wielded political power to debase the politically powerless rather than against the politically disempowered themselves.

'Ser de Sansueña' (pp. 417–19) and 'Silla del rey' put forward other moments in Spanish history as further models of the other Spain with which the speaker wishes to cure the then contemporary Spain. In this respect, these poems are further examples not only of the use of history in and against history but also of the identification with earlier cultures evident in poems such as 'Las edades' and 'Retrato de poeta'. The speaker's description of Sansueña (a fictional country readily recognizable as Spain) in 'Ser de Sansueña' echoes the animality and denial of spirit found in Fascist Spain in 'Es lástima que fuera mi tierra': in Sansueña, Man really succumbs (ll. 7–9) and the 'tú' is described as the compatriot of Sansueña's fauna (l. 25).[37] In this respect, I agree with Silver's comment that Sansueña is no longer the 'nation that put things of the spirit foremost' ('*Arcadia*', p. 198) and with Ruiz Silva's argument that the Spain represented in 'Ser de Sansueña' is 'indeleblemente entroncada con la brutalidad de la guerra civil y con su desastroso final' (p. 125). In contrast to the constructive tendency of 'Díptico español', the speaker in 'Ser de Sansueña' vents his anger at the then contemporary Spain and wishes that he had been alive when Spain was an imperial power (ll. 31–37), a duality that means that 'Ser de Sansueña' cannot be straightforwardly included in what Ugarte calls the 'series of

invectives, accusations, and curses' with which Cernuda 'lashes out' at Spain (p. 186). In the present, as Harris has also noted (p. 90), the supposed glories of Spain's past are in ruins (l. 39) and the speaker can only lament that he should have to witness and be associated with such national decay (ll. 41–42).

Just as the speaker's nostalgia in 'Bien está que fuera tu tierra' was inseparable from his deployment of Galdós against Spain's historical present, so 'Silla del rey' commemorates Spain's imperial past and attempts to use it against the maggots ('Ser de Sansueña'; l. 39) of the then contemporary Spain. The poem consists of Philip II's meditation, spoken as he watches the construction of the Escorial, on what he has achieved in his reign and on how history will treat it. However, as will become apparent, the treatment of the past in 'Silla del rey' includes a critical distance that was absent in 'Bien está que fuera tu tierra' and 'Ser de Sansueña' but which echoes that directed at Spain's leaders in 'Es lástima que fuera mi tierra' and at Goethe in 'El poeta y la bestia'.

There are a number of similarities between 'Silla del rey' and the poems of 'Díptico español'. For example, Philip II describes his subjects as illogical (l. 51) and sees his task as being to disable the animality (ll. 9 and 13) raging in his empire and to construct spirit (ll. 74–75). However, the most striking similarity between the two poems is the interest they both display in the exercise and achievement of freedom: Philip II claims that, in moulding his subjects' lives according to his Catholic canon (l. 27), he has liberated them (ll. 26–30) and that he has united his subjects' wills in a great, although absurd, task (l. 48) which gives their lives purpose (ll. 46–50). The exercise of freedom is also at stake in the King's guardianship of the Catholic faith (l. 4), while his aim is, in part, to bring to life his eternal work (ll. 71–75) in his mind (ll. 96–97), that is, to engender an eternity inextricable from freedom in finite, human consciousness. Finally, the King's description of the nation's life as an immortal flow of legend and history (l. 25) echoes the interpenetration of myth and history in the life of the people of 'Las edades', a poem that Silver also links to 'Silla del rey' ('*Arcadia*', p. 199), and posits his reign as another moment in history when the finite and infinite were united.

At the same time, however, both Philip II's political project and his execution of it are the antithesis of the generous Cervantine tradition that is tolerant of opposing loyalties ('Bien está que fuera tu tierra'; ll. 162–63). This is shown by the totalitarian tone of Philip II's comments that 'todo traza mi trama' (l. 21) and that life is adapting to his Catholic canon (ll. 26–27); by his hesitant pride in killing diversity (l. 31); by his emphasis on dogma (l. 76); and by his persecution of so-called heresy (ll. 77–85). In a similarly

contrastive vein, Spain's present in 'Silla del rey' is imposed on it dictatorially by one man who identifies with Caesar (ll. 76–80), whereas the emphasis in 'Bien está que fuera tu tierra' was on collective national self-determination (ll. 160–65). In addition, Philip II's claims that his reign represents the summit of Spanish history (ll. 61–63) and that his reign will be reflected in the future (ll. 96–102) also contradict the struggle of the other Spain in 'Bien está que fuera tu tierra' (ll. 164–65) for the future appropriate to it.

What, then, is the relation between the reign of Philip II as described in 'Silla del rey' and the project of using poetry to intervene in the historical present? After worrying over what the future holds for his work, the King concludes that future centuries will consider it a gloss on their own times and a glory (ll. 61–65). The foundation of Philip II's reign on death (l. 31), its dictatorial overtones, Catholicism, and intolerance all parallel the Spain described in 'Es lástima que fuera mi tierra' and make 'Silla del rey' an allegorical gloss on Fascist Spain, as Summerhill has also suggested (pp. 155–56). However, as a gloss on future centuries, Philip II's reign also highlights what is lacking in Fascist Spain since his reign cannot be equated with the animality and degradation of the Spain of 'Es lástima que fuera mi tierra'. As the embodiment of what Fascist Spain lacks, Philip II's reign is an example of the goal it must attain in order to be saved, its heaven ('gloria'; 'Silla del rey', l. 65). In this sense, it is one of the spiritual achievements that the speaker in 'Es lástima que fuera mi tierra' described as humanity's patrimony and legacy to the future (ll. 13–14) and sought, in turn, to pass on. However, contrary to the arguments of Kitching-Schulman and Talens (pp. 309–10), 'Silla del rey' should not be read as an apology for dictatorship nor as uncritical of Philip II.[38]

The poem 'El César' (pp. 432–37) develops threads of both 'Ser de Sansueña' and, in particular, 'Silla del rey'.[39] In 'Ser de Sansueña' (ll. 26–27), the speaker stated that corruption was the price of power, a statement echoed in 'El César' in the Caesar's comment that power corrupts the spirit just as a hidden illness corrupts the body (ll. 97–100). Significantly, in 'Silla del rey', Philip II also compares the sophistry of power to a vile evil that eats away at the body (ll. 91–94), a comparison which underlines his earlier identification with Caesar (ll. 76–80). Similarly, the Caesar's speech in 'El César' represents an instance of the sophistry practised by Philip II (see, for example, 'Silla del rey', ll. 86–90). Finally, a few lines after referring to power's corrupting effect, the Caesar changes his mind and says that, rather than corrupting, power maddens and isolates (ll. 110–11). Given that power's isolating effect divinizes the Caesar (ll. 100–03), which echoes Philip II's self-perception as divine (ll. 81–85), the emperor's change of mind implicitly

adds a further dimension to the criticism of Philip II's reign by implying that the King was mad and did not represent his subjects.[40]

The poems that I have discussed in this chapter fulfill the two functions that Schlegel attributed to mythology in his 'Talk on Mythology'. Firstly, poetry is mythological because it is capable of representing the Absolute, a potential frequently realized in the speaker's remembrance of earlier cultures or historical individuals in which/whom nature and freedom were reconciled or contradictions united. Such acts of remembrance reflect the speaker's desire to establish a bridge between the pre-modern (both Spanish and non-Spanish) and the present. The speaker's aim in establishing this bridge is not to restore the so-called glories of pre-modern times or solely to mourn their loss but, rather, to uncover and build on the ruins of the past marginalized by the present. The second factor that makes poetry mythological is its capacity to portray the present's sublimity, the present's failure to perceive the Absolute. As is not the case with his contemporaries, the speaker experiences the present as sublime as the result of his ongoing exercise of his freedom, which is at the root of his critical attitude. In these different two ways, freedom is central to Cernuda's later poetry, which can, therefore, properly be described as a mythology of freedom through which the speaker attempts to construct in the present a culture of freedom that develops the past without uncritically duplicating it.

NOTES

1. Andrew Bowie, *Aesthetics and Subjectivity: From Kant to Nietzsche* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990; repr. 1993), p. 42.
2. Kathleen M. Wheeler describes Romantic art in similar terms. See her 'Introduction', in *German Aesthetic and Literary Criticism: The Romantic Ironists and Goethe*, ed. by Kathleen M. Wheeler (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), pp. 1–27 (pp. 8, 11, 15).
3. Karl Heinz Bohrer, 'Friedrich Schlegels Rede über die Mythologie', in *Mythos und Moderne: Begriff und Bild einer Rekonstruktion*, ed. by Karl Heinz Bohrer (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1983), pp. 52–82 (p. 59). Quoted in Bowie, p. 53.
4. Ernst Behler and Roman Struc, 'Introduction', in Friedrich Schlegel, '*Dialogue on Poetry*' *and Literary Aphorisms*, trans. by Ernst Behler and Roman Struc (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1968), pp. 3–50 (pp. 4, 5). Schlegel's 'Talk on Mythology' is on pages 81–93 of this same volume.
5. For Behler and Struc, the 'transformation and transfiguration of the objective world' was the 'very essence' of Schlegel's new mythology (p. 28).
6. Marcus Paul Bullock, *Romanticism and Marxism: The Philosophical Development of Literary Theory and Literary History in Walter Benjamin and Friedrich Schlegel*, AUS: Series 1—Germanic Languages and Literature, 51 (New York: Peter Lang, 1987), p. 100.
7. For other accounts of productive or creative imagination, see Behler and Struc, pp. 16–18; and Jürgen Habermas, 'The Entry into Postmodernity: Nietzsche as a Turning Point', in *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures*, trans. by Frederick Lawrence (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1987), pp. 83–105 (pp. 89–91).

8. For other readings of Schlegel's new mythology, see Bowie, pp. 53–57; Howard E. Hugo, 'An Examination of Friedrich Schlegel's "Gespräch über die Poesie"', *Monatshefte*, 40 (1948), 221–31 (pp. 226–28); René Wellek, 'Friedrich Schlegel', in *A History of Modern Criticism, 1750–1950*, II: *The Romantic Age* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1955; repr. 1961), pp. 5–35 (pp. 16–17); Behler and Struc, pp. 25–29; Hans Eichner, *Friedrich Schlegel*, TWAS, 98 (New York: Twayne, 1970), pp. 74–82; and Habermas, pp. 88–92.
9. According to Bowie, Kant's notion of the sublime was central to early Romanticism (p. 39). Bowie's account of the Kantian sublime is in *Aesthetics and Subjectivity*, pp. 34–40. For another account, see J. M. Bernstein, 'Memorial Aesthetics: Kant's *Critique of Judgement*', in *The Fate of Art: Aesthetic Alienation from Kant to Derrida and Adorno* (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992), pp. 17–65 (pp. 38–44).
10. Luis Cernuda, *Obra completa*, ed. by Derek Harris and Luis Maristany, 3 vols (Madrid: Siruela, 1993–1994), I: *Poesía completa* (1993), pp. 489–91. Unless otherwise specified, all future references to Cernuda's work will be to this volume and in the form of page numbers. For other readings of 'Mozart', see Silver, '*Arcadia*', pp. 169, 180; Harris, pp. 172–73; J. C. Ruiz Silva, 'En torno a un poema de Luis Cernuda: "Mozart"', *CHA*, 316 (1976), 61–65; Jiménez-Fajardo, pp. 138–39; Carlos Ruiz Silva, *Arte, amor y otras soledades en Luis Cernuda: ensayo* (Madrid: la Torre, 1979), pp. 161–65; Luis Antonio de Villena, 'Luis Cernuda, entre el exilio y sus metáforas', in Luis Cernuda, *Las Nubes. Desolación de la Quimera*, ed. by Luis Antonio de Villena, Letras hispánicas, 209 (Madrid: Cátedra, 1984), pp. 11–57 (pp. 47, 55–56); and Sánchez Rosillo, p. 172. Unless otherwise specified, all future references to Ruiz Silva's work will be to *Arte, amor y otras soledades*.
11. For other readings of this poem, see José Olivio Jiménez, 'Emoción y trascendencia del tiempo en la poesía de Luis Cernuda', in *Cinco poetas del tiempo: Vicente Aleixandre, Luis Cernuda, José Hierro, Carlos Bousoño, Francisco Brines* (Madrid: Ínsula, 1964), pp. 101–54 (pp. 146, 151); Silver, '*Arcadia*', pp. 168, 180–81; Debicki, pp. 298–99; Coleman, pp. 169, 173–75; Harris, pp. 106–07; Martínez Cuitiño, pp. 136–37; and Philip Silver, 'Towards a Revisionary Theory of Spanish Romanticism', *REH*, 28 (1994), 293–302 (pp. 299–300).

    Philip Silver points to a link between poetry and the sublime (although he does not use the term) when he states that 'words can only hint' at the pre-poetic experience described in this poem ('*Arcadia*', p. 181), an experience which he refers to as 'como una visión del Ser no disperso' ('Cernuda, poeta ontológico', in *Luis Cernuda*, ed. by Derek Harris, pp. 203–11 (p. 209)). The eponymous poet is widely understood to be Juan Ramón Jiménez. See, for example, Silver, '*Arcadia*', pp. 168, 180; and Harris, pp. 106–07.
12. Although other critics have also noted that the 'tú' in this poem is not only passive, none has explicitly linked his activity with his freedom. See, for example, Silver, '*Arcadia*', p. 180; Debicki, pp. 298–99; Harris, pp. 106–07; and Silver, 'Towards a Revisionary Theory', p. 300.
13. See Friedrich Schlegel, *Philosophical Fragments*, trans. by Peter Firchow (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991), p. 2.
14. For other readings of 'Río vespertino', see Silver, '*Arcadia*', pp. 152, 181; Harris, pp. 64, 79, 105–06, 111, 114, 158; Maximino Cacheiro, 'La problemática del escrito en "La realidad y el deseo"', *CHA*, 316 (1976), 54–60 (pp. 55, 56–57); Silver, 'Poeta ontológico', p. 209; Jiménez-Fajardo, pp. 90–92; Ruiz Silva, pp. 95–96, 105–06; Kevin J. Bruton, 'Luis Cernuda's Exile Poetry and Coleridge's Theory of Imagination', *CLS*, 21 (1984), 383–95 (pp. 391–92); and López Castro, p. 88.
15. Similarly, in the 'Talk on Mythology', Schlegel posited the Absolute as the condition of knowledge: 'every hypothesis', he wrote, 'even the most limited, if systematically thought through, leads to hypotheses of the whole, and depends on such hypotheses' (p. 90).

16. For other readings of 'Tarde oscura', see Coleman, pp. 47–49; Harris, p. 152; and Utrera, pp. 129, 136. For other readings of 'Otras ruinas', see Silver, '*Arcadia*', pp. 174–75; Coleman, pp. 81–83; and Jiménez-Fajardo, pp. 110–11.
17. For other readings of this poem, see Silver, '*Arcadia*', pp. 37–38, 198–99; Jiménez-Fajardo, pp. 111–12; Maristany, '*La realidad y el deseo*', pp. 83–84; Argullol, p. 32; and Silver, *De la mano*, pp. 113–14.
18. For other readings of 'Noche del hombre y su demonio', see Silver, '*Arcadia*', pp. 177–78; Coleman, pp. 18–19, 106–11; Harris, pp. 116–17, 156–60; Luis Maristany, 'La poesía de Luis Cernuda', in *Luis Cernuda*, ed. by Derek Harris, pp. 185–202 (pp. 187, 197–98, 200); Jiménez-Fajardo, pp. 75–76; Quirarte, pp. 70, 71–72; Lorraine Ledford, 'Cernuda's *Demonio*: Devil or Divinity?', in *Essays in Honor of Jorge Guillén on the Occasion of his 85th Year*, ed. by Martha G. Krow-Lucal (Cambridge, MA: Abedul Press, 1977), pp. 42–51; and Summerhill, pp. 150–51.
19. Lorraine Ledford also posits freedom as the ground of the poet's identity in 'Noche del hombre y su demonio' by stating that the 'demon' makes the 'man' 'realize [...] that his choice of lifestyle was voluntary' (p. 47). Coleman has linked the poet in this poem with morality in a contradictory way. On the one hand, he argues that the poet 'can never uphold the values of the ordinary man' and 'must approach the Divinity with his art, serving as opposite to the moral collapse to which the devil invites him'. On the other, he asserts that the 'poet's superiority has nothing to do with morality' (p. 19).
20. For other readings of this poem, see Coleman, pp. 169, 173, 175; Jiménez-Fajardo, p. 123; Maristany, '*La realidad y el deseo*', pp. 38, 85; Villena, p. 38; Summerhill, p. 162; and Antonio Monegal, 'Pre-texto e intertexto en "Retrato de poeta", de Luis Cernuda', *BFFGL*, no. 9 (June 1991), 65–75 (pp. 65–73).
21. For other readings of this poem, see Harris, p. 89; Montoro, pp. 21–22; Maristany, 'La poesía', p. 200; Pato, pp. 100–01; and Martha LaFollette Miller, 'Society, History, and the Fate of the Poetic Word in *La realidad y el deseo*', in *The Word and the Mirror*, pp. 166–80 (pp. 168–69).
22. For other readings of this poem, see Olivio Jiménez, 'Emoción', pp. 135–36, 140–41, 148; Silver, '*Arcadia*', pp. 149–50, 178–79; Harris, pp. 112–13, 154, 155–56; LaFollette Miller, pp. 170–73; and Utrera, pp. 127, 134, 142–44.

    Incomprehension also characterizes the reception of the poet's work in '*Malentendu*' (pp. 524–25), 'Del otro lado' (pp. 525–26; ll. 8–18), and 'Soledades' (p. 464; ll. 7–9). For other readings of '*Malentendu*', see Harris, p. 167; and Villena, pp. 49–50. Maristany discusses 'Del otro lado' in '*La realidad y el deseo*' (pp. 30–31, 32). For different readings of 'Soledades', see Silver, '*Arcadia*', p. 177; and Jiménez-Fajardo, p. 121.
23. For other readings of 'Silla del rey', see Silver, '*Arcadia*', pp. 190, 198–202; Coleman, pp. 116, 121–30; Harris, pp. 102–03, 107–08, 113–14; Talens, pp. 128–30, 279, 309–10; Jiménez-Fajardo, pp. 112–13; Pinto, pp. 34–35, 100–01, 106; and Summerhill, pp. 153–57.
24. Other critics who have drawn attention to Philip II's pride are Silver, '*Arcadia*', p. 202; and Harris, pp. 107, 113.
25. For other readings of this poem, see Müller, pp. 49–50; Harris, p. 174; Mercedes Cárdenas, 'Un tema cernudiano: el poeta como ser privilegiado', *Ínsula*, no. 327 (February 1974), 1 and 10 (p. 10); Sánchez Reboredo, pp. 12–13, and Sánchez Rosillo, p. 173.
26. For Sánchez Reboredo, this episode symbolizes 'la fragilidad del genio' and the opposition between 'las fuerzas verdaderamente constructivas' and 'los impulsos destructores' (p. 13), while, for Sánchez Rosillo, it represents one of the ways in which 'la sociedad burguesa' seeks to 'neutralizar el permanente peligro que el verdadero creador representa' (p. 173).

27. Other instances include 'Góngora' (pp. 330–32), '1936' (pp. 544–46; ll. 1–5) and 'Mozart', especially its third and final section (ll. 43–63). For other readings of 'Góngora', see Silver, '*Arcadia*', pp. 169, 193–94; Harris, pp. 110, 115–16, 154–56; Sánchez Reboredo, pp. 13–14; Jiménez-Fajardo, pp. 74–75; Maristany, '*La realidad y el deseo*', pp. 38, 80–81; and Sánchez Rosillo, pp. 153–54. For other readings of '1936', see Harris, p. 175; Olivio Jiménez, '*Desolación*', pp. 334–35; Jiménez-Fajardo, pp. 147–48; Villena, p. 51; and Pato, pp. 97–98, 101.
28. Jiménez-Fajardo has also noted that Goethe is a contradictory figure (p. 144). Müller speculates that the speaker's puzzlement is caused by Cernuda overlooking Goethe's interest in politics (p. 50).
29. For other readings of 'Díptico español', see Müller, p. 51; Cano, 'Estela', pp. 251–2, 254–55; Harris, pp. 168–69, 174–75; Jiménez-Fajardo, pp. 145–47; Villena, pp. 44–45; Antonio Muñoz Molina, 'Cernuda y Galdós: una elegía española', in *A una verdad: Luis Cernuda, 1902–1963*, ed. by Andrés Trapiello and Juan Manuel Bonet (Seville: Universidad internacional Menéndez Pelayo, 1988), pp. 62–63; José I. Gracia Noriega, 'España y Luis Cernuda', *CNor*, 10 (1989), 37–42 (pp. 40, 41–42); Michael Ugarte, 'Exilic Reality and Desire', in *Shifting Ground: Spanish Civil War Exile Literature* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1989), pp. 167–88 (pp. 182, 186–87); and LaFollette Miller, pp. 167–68, 173.
30. Jiménez-Fajardo (pp. 145, 146) and Müller (p. 51), among others, have also noted this poem's historical specificity and that the speaker seeks to recover a positive national tradition.
31. For other readings of 'Supervivencias tribales en el medio literario', see Harris, pp. 166, 167–68; and Villena, p. 50. See Harris (p. 166), Villena (p. 50), and Sahuquillo (p. 368) for other discussions of 'Otra vez, con sentimiento'.
32. For Muñoz Molina (p. 63), this situation fulfills the prophecy which Galdós made about Spain's future on the last page of the *Episodios nacionales*.
33. Poetry, conscience, and freedom also combine in the figure of Góngora in the poem of that name (ll. 14–15, 27–28, and 50–52).
34. I therefore disagree with Gracia Noriega (p. 40) and Quirarte (p. 117) who argue that the speaker adopts an individualist position. An individualist notion of freedom is rejected in the poem 'El prisionero' (p. 395) as a desolate victory, a figure of death (ll. 11–12). For another reading of 'El prisionero', see Jiménez-Fajardo, p. 103.
35. Jiménez-Fajardo describes Monsalud, the protagonist of the second series of *Episodios nacionales*, as a 'fighter for freedom and against tradition' (p. 146). For more information on Monsalud, see Brian J. Dendle, *Galdós: The Early Historical Novels* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1986), pp. 27, 88–127, 148–53, 155–57, 159–63, 165.
36. Similarly, Jiménez-Fajardo has argued that the speaker in 'Díptico español' both addresses himself to those who 'continue to respect life and reason' (p. 146) and seeks to echo the voice of those who, throughout Spain's history, 'sacrificed themselves against violence and unreason' (p. 147).
37. For other readings of 'Ser de Sansueña', see Silver, '*Arcadia*', pp. 198–99; Harris, pp. 89–90; Talens, pp. 128–29; Jiménez-Fajardo, pp. 113–14; Peyrègne, pp. 131–32; and Ugarte, p. 186.
38. Aline Kitching-Schulman, '*La realidad y el deseo*: ¿autobiografía poética?', in *Teoría del discurso poético: Actes du Vème colloque du S[éminaire d'] É[tudes] L[ittéraires]* (Toulouse: Toulouse–Le Mirail University Press, 1986), pp. 127–36 (p. 135). Other critics who are aware of the critical angle adopted in this poem include Silver, '*Arcadia*', p. 202; Coleman, p. 116; and Summerhill, pp. 154, 156–57.

39. For other readings of 'El César', see Coleman, pp. 116, 130–35; Harris, pp. 135, 172; Ruiz Silva, p. 128; Kitching-Schulman, p. 135; and Summerhill, pp. 153–59.
40. Silver also argues that the Philip II of 'Silla del rey' is all but obsessed ('*Arcadia*', p. 200) and a 'near kin' of the 'mad' emperor in 'El César' ('*Arcadia*', p. 202) while Pinto describes Philip II as ill and obsessed (p. 102) and refers to the process of 'descomposición sicológica' visible in 'Silla del rey' (p. 106).