

CHAPTER SIX

VERISIMILITUDE AND THE ARGUMENTUM

ARGUMENTUM: A NARRATIVE GENRE

In rhetorical theory the concept of verisimilitude, apart from being a virtue required of narrative in general, is associated with one type of narrative in particular, the *argumentum*. The rhetoricians of antiquity had devised a highly stratified classification of the different species of *narratio*, in which the *argumentum* occupies a well defined, although subordinate, place.¹ Cicero, in *De inventione*, and the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* distinguish three basic *genera narrationis*, the first two of which, an account of the facts of the case under consideration, or one involving a digression from the facts, are properly rhetorical, in that they are regularly used by the orator in forensic and deliberative contexts, while the third, which interests us, is said to fall outside the domain of public affairs, and concerns the student of eloquence only in so far as its cultivation will provide him with good practice for the first two types.² The third genre is thus really part of the *praeexercitamina* or *progymnasmata*, the system of preliminary exercises for training the orator, which were sometimes considered to belong to grammar rather than rhetoric.³ This third class is divided into two, according to whether it has as its theme persons or affairs (*personae* or *negotia*), and the second of these sub-classes is ramified still further, into *fabula*, *historia*, and *argumentum*. These are explained in the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* as follows:

Fabula est quae neque veras neque veri similes continet res, ut eae sunt quae tragoediis traditae sunt. Historia est gesta res, sed ab aetatis nostrae memoria remota. Argumentum est ficta res quae tamen fieri potuit, velut argumenta comoediarum. (1.8.13)

Together these three kinds of narrative form a generic sub-system in which *historia* and *fabula* represent the extreme poles of fact and fiction, with *argumentum* occupying a place in between. Because it is a fictional genre, *argumentum* is distinct from history and more closely related to fable; but because it must be invented in a plausible way, it is also marked off from fable and resembles the factual narration that is characteristic of history. The position of *argumentum* in

this triad is thus determined by its two definitive characteristics, fiction and verisimilitude. Quintilian is explicit: 'argumentum, quod falsum sed vero simile' (*Institutio oratoria*, II.4.2).

From the association made between *fabula* and tragedy and *argumentum* and comedy it is apparent that these are types of literary, not rhetorical, narration. Cicero goes further than the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* and actually illustrates each genre by a literary quotation.⁴ Literature was traditionally assigned to the province of grammar, defined by Quintilian (I.4.2) as 'recte loquendi scientia et poetarum enarratio', and so the literary application of these narrative types would be another reason, besides their status as *praeexercitamina*, to exclude them from the purview of rhetoric and give them to grammar. Yet the terms *fabula*, *historia*, *argumentum* do not seem ever to have been at home with the grammarians, who do not normally divide literature into these categories, tending instead to use a classification based on the degree of directness of representation. Thus they distinguish between the *genus activum*, narratives in which only the characters speak, the *genus enarrativum*, where the poet alone speaks, and the *genus commune*, in which both characters and poet speak (see Curtius, pp. 439–40). In grammatical treatises, the triad of *fabula*, *historia*, *argumentum*, or a system of classification akin to it, is comparatively rare: it is found in the *Praeexercitamina* of Priscian and in the first book (*De grammatica*) of Isidore's *Etymologiae*.⁵

Within the overall system of rhetoric *fabula*, *historia*, and *argumentum* have little significance. They occupy a very low position in the hierarchy of narrative genres and, because of their literary quality, have no direct application in any of the contexts with which oratory is concerned. Even so, this sub-system (by which I mean not just the terms, but the values that define their relationship to each other) endured into the Middle Ages unimpaired. The classical sources of rhetorical doctrine continued to be studied, and the triad of *fabula*, *historia*, and *argumentum* is repeated by later authors, such as Martianus Capella in the fifth century and John of Garland in the thirteenth.⁶ But it was perhaps Isidore's *Etymologiae* that, more than any other authority, shaped the medieval understanding of the three genres; in particular I think it can be shown that later modifications to the classical theory of *argumentum* flow from ambiguities, or even insufficiencies, in Isidore's treatment of it.

Fabula and *historia* — but not *argumentum* — are discussed at some length by Isidore at the end of the first book of the *Etymologiae*, which is devoted to grammar. He explains each of the two terms by its etymological derivation (*fabula* is said to come from *fari*, 'to speak', 'quia non sunt res factae sed tantum loquendo factae', *historia* from the Greek *apo tou historein*, meaning 'to see', because 'apud veteres enim nemo conscribebat historiam, nisi is qui interfuisset'), enumerates the various different kinds of fable and history, gives some account of their function and utility, and names the most famous writers of each

genre (*Etymologiae*, I.40.1–44.4). Then, at the end of his exposition of history, Isidore adds a sentence which is plainly taken from the classical rhetoricians:

Item inter historiam et argumentum et fabulam interesse. Nam historiae sunt res verae quae factae sunt; argumenta sunt quae etsi facta non sunt, fieri tamen possunt; fabulae vero sunt quae nec factae sunt nec fieri possunt, quia contra naturam sunt. (I.44.5)

The introduction of the third term, *argumentum*, appears as something of an afterthought. Isidore had clearly not intended to treat it at all, for in the list of the thirty 'divisiones grammaticae artis', which he had given earlier in the book and constitutes his agenda for discussion, the term *argumentum* does not appear, but *fabula* and *historia* do (I.5.4). It is as though, having set out with the intention of describing and contrasting *fabula* and *historia* only, Isidore could not help but be reminded of the rhetorical context where these terms occur together, which he then cites even though it goes beyond what he had originally proposed to discuss.⁷ The effect is to create a certain unevenness in his presentation: in theory, it is suggested, there are actually three genres, which together form a closed system, but in practice Isidore talks about only two of them. The subsequent reception of his doctrine is best understood as an attempt to correct the uncertainties that result from this unevenness.

In the last quarter of the eleventh century Bernard, a teacher at the cathedral school of Utrecht, wrote a commentary on the eclogue of Theodulus. It begins with an introduction, or *accessus* to that poet, which is also a general compendium of poetological vocabulary, for Bernard uses every opportunity to elucidate terminology even if it is not strictly pertinent to the task in hand. His mode of exposition is etymological, based for the most part on Isidore.⁸ Among the several genres discussed by Bernard when he comes to *qualitas carminis* are *fabula*, *historia*, and *argumentum*. Bernard defines them as follows:

Fabula igitur est quod neque gestum est neque geri potuit, dicta a fando quid in dictis tantum, non in factis constet . . . Historia autem est res gesta sed a memoria hominum remota, tracta apud ystorin id est videre: solos enim fieri rem videntes olim scribere licebat . . . Argumentum vero est quodammodo res ficta, quae tamen fieri potest, ut in comediis; est enim aliquid quod diffinit Tullius dubiae rei fidem faciens. (Huygens, p. 63)

It is noticeable that Bernard does not give an etymological explanation of *argumentum*. This reflects the differing amounts of information provided about each of the three terms by Isidore. With *fabula* and *historia*, which Isidore had treated in detail, Bernard has plenty to go on, and his exposition is in fact a condensed version of the relevant sections of the *Etymologiae*.⁹ But with *argumentum*, which, as we saw, Isidore mentions only briefly and as an afterthought, he is offered far less guidance — not even an etymology. He compensates for this lack of information in his source by bringing in all the rhetorical theory he can possibly associate with the term. The first half of his definition of *argumentum*, 'res ficta, quae tamen fieri potest', is the familiar one; the second half

however has nothing to do with *argumentum* as a *genus narrationis*, but alludes to the same term's use in an altogether different rhetorical context, that of the *argumentatio*. This is a part of the oration quite separate from the *narratio*, and its function is to win over the audience to the orator's point of view by means of reasoned argument. The individual methods of proof that the speaker has at his disposal are known as *probationes* or *argumenta*, and the areas of experience on which he may draw for his arguments are called *loci* or *topoi* (see Lausberg, paras 348–430). As Cicero, the source for the second half of Bernard's definition of *argumentum*, puts it in his treatise on topics: 'licet definire locum esse argumenti sedem, argumentum autem rationem quae rei dubiae faciat fidem' (*Topica*, II, 8). Here the word *argumentum* is used in the sense of *probatio*, and it has nothing to do with narrative genres. That Bernard should have brought together two quite distinct usages of the same term in rhetorical theory is not just, to my mind, evidence of his compilatory method of work, it also reveals his awareness of the sketchy nature of Isidore's exposition, which he tries to round out in this way.¹⁰

Conrad of Hirsau, who knew Bernard's commentary and used it for his *Dialogus super auctores*,¹¹ responds to the same problem in a different way: he tries to eliminate *argumentum* from the system of genres altogether, leaving behind Isidore's original twofold schema of fable and history. The three terms are mentioned by Conrad and defined rather laconically in the introductory part of the dialogue, in which he introduces his pupil to elementary critical vocabulary:

Historia est res visa, res gesta: historin enim grece, latine visio dicitur, unde historiografus rei visae scriptor dicitur. (Huygens (1970), p. 75)

Fabula est quod neque gestum est nec geri potuit. (p. 76)

Argumentum est dubiae rei fidem faciens, sicut ait Tullius. (p. 77)

Conrad does not mention that *argumentum* is also a narrative genre characterized by verisimilitude. By taking up only the second part of Bernard's definition, which refers to argument in the sense of *probatio*, Conrad in effect refuses to acknowledge that there is a kind of narrative located between fable and history, fictional but nevertheless with the force of truth. This accords with his rigoristic condemnation of all secular, fictional literature as mendacious; in a dispute with his pupil over whether there may be some truth in the fables of Aesop, he maintains, in terms that go far beyond the specific point at issue:

Aliud enim sunt poemata et in his vulgaria proverbialia nihil ponderis habentia, utpote quasi sonus levis transeuntia, aliud divina eloquia, quae fundata et aeterna sunt spiritali intelligentia . . . Sunt igitur in literatura seculari verborum quidem signa aliquid significantia, sed spiritali intelligentiae minime compendientia nec ad veritatis rationem expressiva.¹²

The classical system of *fabula*, *argumentum*, and *historia* contains two binary oppositions. The first is that of fictional (*fabula*, *argumentum*) versus non-fictional

narratives (*historia*). The second is between those genres whose representation in some way approximates to perceived reality (*historia, argumentum*) and those that are implausibly fantastic (*fabula*). What Conrad has done is to focus on only one of these oppositions, the first, and squeeze out the middle genre of *argumentum*.

The Middle Ages, to summarize the discussion so far, had inherited a theoretical knowledge of *argumentum* from two sources. From the classical rhetoricians it could learn of a type of narrative situated between history and fable, between pure fact and pure fiction, and whose defining characteristic is verisimilitude. It could also learn about *argumentum* from the grammatical tradition emanating from Isidore, where however the theory of the narrative genre becomes contaminated with the other sense of *argumentum* in rhetoric, that of *probatio*. The conflation of the two usages is not as careless as it may seem; since the distinctive feature of *argumentum* is a style of narration that revolves around concepts of plausibility and possibility ('quod fieri potest'), it follows that the various *probationes* prescribed by theory can be of help to the narrator in achieving a logically consistent, and thus credible, narrative.

The literary scope of *argumentum* was traditionally restricted to the plots of the comedians.¹³ But it is not hard to see how the theory of a genre located between history and fable and based on a principle of verisimilitude might find a practical outlet in Gottfried's Tristan romance, the poetics of which, I have been suggesting, uses a concept of verisimilitude in response to problems created by the author's literary historical situation, that of being between the vernacular traditions of archival historiography and experimental romance.

TRISTAN'S COMBAT WITH MOROLD

It is well known that Gottfried narrates the hero's duel with Morold as though it were a battle of armies, in deliberate deviation from the received tradition (6866–905, 6978–7008, 7061). What has never, to my knowledge, been observed is that Gottfried presents his version of the episode as an *argumentum*, in both senses of the term: as a fictitious story that nevertheless is plausible, and as a *dubia res* standing in need of proof.

Gottfried begins by stating the nature of the fight according to general opinion and the authoritative source:

Nu hoere ich al die werlde jehen
und stat ouch an dem maere,
daz diz ein einwic waere,
und ist ir aller jehede dar an,
hien waeren niuwan zwene man. (6866–70)

This is how the story is preserved in the archive. Gottfried isolates himself from archival tradition, though, making it clear that his own view is without precedent:

ich prüevez aber an dirre zit,
 daz ez ein offener strit
 von zwein ganzen rotten was;
 swie ich doch daz nie gelas
 an Tristandes maere,
 ich machez doch warbaere. (6871–76)

The version proposed by Gottfried is thus a *ficta res* and, because it contradicts the perception of ‘al die werlde’, a *dubia res*. It is therefore a proper object of argumentative treatment in every sense. The key terms are *warbaere machen* and *prüeven*, ‘to show to be plausible’¹⁴ and ‘to prove’. They correspond exactly to the workings of *argumentum* in its hybrid definition as a narrative genre that presents a fictional story as though it could have happened in reality and as a proof that can make an otherwise dubious case seem credible.

The assertion that the judicial duel was in fact a full-scale battle of armies not only diverges from written tradition, it also appears to contradict the law of verisimilitude, since on Gottfried’s admission it goes against the postulates of *natura*, *mos*, and *opinio*. Or, to use Thomas’s terms, this version appears to have neither *verur* nor *raisun* on its side (see above, pp. 93–94). Gottfried nevertheless claims plausibility for his account, which I think can be brought within the ambit of rhetorical *verisimilitudo*. This verisimilitude is an image or effect of truthfulness that arises when the audience is able to convert the arguments of the orator into experimental categories and on that basis accepts them as authentic. There is more to this process than a simple checking of textual statements to see whether they correspond to perceived reality, for if this were so we should be neglecting the active contribution made by the orator’s discourse to producing an effect of truth. The recognition of the persuasive force of words is the very foundation of rhetoric. The text or discourse is capable of modifying the audience’s perceptions of reality because, no less than the everyday world, it forms part of their empirical experience; if the audience can live out textual propositions in a manner that is accessible to conventional reason, then these will be accepted as plausible. Now, with his account of the fight with Morold, Gottfried has deliberately made things difficult for himself by introducing a discrepancy between everyday experience of the world, which leads the audience to believe that a combat between two men is exactly that, and textual proposition, which has it that the two men are in fact two armies. His task is to demonstrate the plausibility of this extravagant statement by offering a textual experience of it that will ring true for his public. This he accomplishes by means of a virtuoso *argumentum*.

Gottfried turns first to Morold, introducing an *argumentum a persona*, a rhetorical means of proving an assertion about a character by referring to some personal attribute of his or hers (see Lausberg, para. 376). In this case, Gottfried refers to Morold’s *habitus corporis*:¹⁵ tradition, as embodied in the true source

(‘diu warheit’) has it that this warrior had the strength of four men; by a metonymic displacement from the quality of strength to those who possess it, Gottfried claims that Morold is therefore a force of four men (6877–80). Tristan is made into an army by giving him three additional companions in ‘got’, ‘reht’, and ‘willeger muot’ (6882–88). In this case, the mode of reasoning proceeds from Gottfried’s interpretation of the nature of the combat, and so might be considered as an *argumentum a re*:¹⁶ the principles for which Tristan stands (God and Justice), and his character in battle (Determination), are represented as active combatants. Tristan’s adjutants belong to the class of supernatural and allegorically significant beings, *divinae* and *fictae personae*, which we identified earlier on as one of the defining characteristics of medieval fiction (see above, pp. 67–71). Their introduction into the account of the duel as contained in ‘Tristandes maere’ and ‘diu warheit’ — by which last designation Gottfried is perhaps suggesting that this is the historical version — opens up new perspectives of meaning on the facts preserved in the archive: an encounter between two men is made intelligible to the public as a conflict of principle, God and Justice against the brute force represented by Morold.

Having substantiated his claim that the duel really involved eight men organized in two detachments, Gottfried looks to his public for agreement:

E duhte iuch, daz diz maere
gar ungevüege waere,
daz uf zwein orsen zwei her
iemer möhten komen ze wer:
nu habt irz vür war vernomen. (6893–97)

Gottfried’s rhetorical proofs have turned this ‘ficta res’ (whose dubious status is emphasized again by the fanciful notion of two armies riding into battle on only two chargers) into one ‘*quae tamen fieri potest*’. From the point of view of the audience, their judgment has been modified by the experience (‘vernemen’) of the arguments, which establishes the case as credible (‘vür war’). In these lines it is not difficult to detect a self-congratulatory pride on Gottfried’s part in the power of his rhetoric to bring about a change in the *communis opinio*: what previously (‘e’) would have been dismissed as extravagant and illogical (‘ungevüege’) is now (‘nu’) accepted as plausible. And, as if to show that he may now count on the new consensus his argument has created, for the remainder of the episode Gottfried refers to the two opponents as ‘geselleschaft’ (6903, 6985, 7007), ‘rotte’ (6985, 6998), ‘schar’ (7003), ‘her’ (7061).

Gottfried’s treatment of the combat between Tristan and Morold has occasionally been described as allegory.¹⁷ It is true that Tristan’s allies ‘reht’ and ‘willeger muot’ are abstract qualities of the sort one finds personified in allegorical poetry (compare figures such as ‘Raison’, ‘Bel Acuel’, ‘Richece’, ‘Oiseuse’ in the *Roman de la Rose*, for example), yet I think that the designation ‘allegory’ is inappropriate in this instance, especially if one adopts the strict

definition of Bernard Silvestris: 'Est autem allegoria oratio sub historica narratione verum et ab exteriori diversum involvens intellectum.'¹⁸ In the Morold episode Gottfried does not narrate a historical event whose inner significance he then goes on to reveal in an exegetical commentary (as in his 'entsliezen' (16924) of the significance of the cave of lovers). Rather, what we witness here is a supplementation of the archival version of the narrative by the experimental construction of fictional figures, along with their meaning:

die viere und jene viere
uz den gebilde ich schiere
zwo ganze rotte oder ahte man,
als übel als ich doch bilden kan. (6889–92)

To the author's *bilden* corresponds the audience's *vernemen*; together the two terms describe a process in which a meaning is engendered experimentally ('Let's see what I can make'), a process that has nothing to do with any mode, allegorical, integumental, parabolic or otherwise, that aims at the disclosure of a pre-existent truth hidden inside the already narrated history.¹⁹

Winfried Christ has drawn attention to Gottfried's 'logische Kultur des Argumentierens' in connexion with the ratiocinative strategies he deploys in the excursus on doubt and suspicion in love (*Rhetorik und Roman*, p. 61, fn. 193). He has also interpreted the Morold passage along similar lines to my reading of it: Gottfried's desire to make his case appear convincing shows him to be promoting a concept of narrative truth that has the status not of fact, but of verisimilitude, in that its credibility for an audience is dependent not on an authoritative source, but on the narrator's powers of logical demonstration: 'die Wahrheit liegt . . . in dem, was die logische Vorstellungskraft des Dichters . . . zwingend erwiesen hat' (p. 304). Christ states that 'der vorgestellte Wahrheitsanspruch ist ein rednerischer' and quotes Wolfgang Monecke on the identical narrative practice of Konrad von Würzburg: 'Erzählen heißt also, eine Geschichte *mit rede bewaeren*, sie als wahr dartzun durch den Vortrag, erprobend, demonstrierend, erweisend berichten.'²⁰ What is missing from Christ's illuminating account of this passage is the attempt to identify precise theoretical sources of Gottfried's narrative technique. The verisimilar representation of the duel as a conflict of two armies is not just generally rhetorical, it is specifically based on an understanding of *argumentum* in which the two originally unrelated definitions of the term have been conflated in practice: the whole narrative is, by Gottfried's own admission, a figment of the poetic imagination, and yet the reader will accept it as plausible because its premises (that each combatant is in fact an army) have been proved in a process of inductive reasoning whose steps he can follow. Through a daring *argumentum* the archival account of Tristan's combat with Morold has been converted into an experimental one.

Walter Haug insists that the fictional poetics of the Arthurian romance has nothing to do with verisimilitude:

Das Mittelalterlich-Fiktionale, wie es sich im arthurischen Roman konkretisiert, beruht gerade nicht auf der Idee des Wahrscheinlichen, diese neue Fiktionalität kommt vielmehr über das freie Spiel mit dem Unwahrscheinlichen zu sich selbst. (*Literaturtheorie*, p. 106)

This is true so long as verisimilitude is identified with the Aristotelian concept of *to eikos*, which is intimately associated with notions of philosophical truth, necessity, exemplarity and universality (see above, pp. 34–35, 80–81). Aristotle's *Poetics* was in any case hardly read in the Middle Ages and it would therefore be an anachronism to connect the Arthurian romance with a theory of verisimilitude that only became current again with the rediscovery of the *Poetics* by the Renaissance. However, in this chapter and the preceding one I have tried to trace the existence, in rhetorical tradition, of a concept of *verisimilitudo* that was both available to the Middle Ages and, moreover, tended towards experimentality. The truth of this rhetorical *verisimilitudo* is the truth of the demonstrably and experimentally plausible, of what can be represented and experienced as credible. And, as Gottfried shows in the Morold episode with his ingenious conversion of the 'ungevüege' into the 'warbaere', this plausible truth can accommodate even the implausible and fantastic.

NOTES TO CHAPTER SIX

1. See Heinrich Lausberg, *Handbuch der literarischen Rhetorik*, paras 290–92.
2. Cicero, *De inventione*, i.19.27: 'Narrationum genera tria sunt: unum genus est in quo ipsa causa et omnis ratio controversiae continetur; alterum, in quo digressio aliqua extra causam . . . interponitur. Tertium genus est remotum a civilibus causis quod delectationis causa non inutili cum exercitatione dicitur et scribitur'; *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, i.8.12: 'Narrationum tria sunt genera. Unum est cum exponimus rem gestam . . . Alterum genus est narrationis, quod intercurrit nonnumquam . . . Tertium genus est id quod a causa civili remotum est, in quo tamen exerceri convenit, quo commodius illas superiores narrationes in causis tractare possimus'.
3. Lausberg, para. 1106; Ernst Robert Curtius, *Europäische Literatur und lateinisches Mittelalter*, p. 440.
4. *De inventione*, i.19.27. *Fabula* is illustrated by the line 'Angues ingentes alites, iuncti iugo', from the tragedian Pacuvius; *historia* by the quotation 'Appius indixit Carthaginiensibus bellum', from Ennius; *argumentum* by a verse from Terence, 'Nam is postquam excessit ex ephēbis' (for detailed references see the note in Hubbell's edition).
5. For Isidore, see below, pp. 101–02. Priscian distinguishes four 'species narrationis': 'civilis', by which he means oratorical narratives, 'fabularis', 'historica', and 'fictilis'. This last category appears to correspond to the rhetoricians' *argumentum*, although Priscian says it is 'ad tragoedias sive comoedias ficta' (*Praeexercitamina ex Hermogene versa*, in *Rhetores latini minores*, edited by Karl Halm, (Leipzig, 1863), p. 552).
6. Martinius Capella, *De arte rhetorica*, in Halm, p. 486; John of Garland, *Parisiāna poetria de arte prosaica metrica et rithmica*, edited by Traugott Lawler, Yale Studies in English, 182 (New Haven, 1974), p. 100 (v, 314–32).
7. Peter von Moos, on the other hand, sees a consistency throughout Isidore's treatment of the genres, to which these last sentences conform; '*Poeta et historicus* im Mittelalter', p. 108, fn. 35.
8. There is no modern edition of the entire text of Bernard's commentary; the introduction has been edited by R. B. C. Huygens, *Accessus ad auctores* (1970 edition). On Bernard's method, see Paul Klopsch, *Einführung in die Dichtungslehren des lateinischen Mittelalters*, pp. 55–62.
9. Bernard takes from Isidore the two classes of fable, 'esopica', and 'libistica' (he also has a third, 'mixta'), and the three sub-genres of historiography, 'cottidiana' ('diurnum' or 'ephemerida' in

- Isidore's nomenclature), 'kalendaria', and 'annua' (here too Bernard adds a further class, 'cronica'); he also follows Isidore in describing the purpose of fable as being either to give pleasure or to provide moral instruction. Compare Huygens, p. 63, and *Etymologiae*, I.40.2–3, 6; I.44.
10. Compare Klopsch, p. 58. There is an analogue to Bernard's combinatory definition in the scholia to Terence: 'argumentum ratio rei dubiae faciens fidem; interdum res ficta, quae tamen sic fieri potuit' (*Scholia Terentiana*, edited by Friedrich Schlee (Leipzig, 1893), pp. 167–68; according to the editor, this particular commentary is later than the eleventh century). It is possible that Bernard was prompted to conflate the two meanings of *argumentum* into one definition by what he found in Isidore, the second book of whose *Etymologiae* (on rhetoric) contains a section on topics, defined as 'disciplina inveniendorum argumentorum', and which contains a catalogue of different kinds of rhetorical argument (II.30). But, contrary to the opinion of Curtius, pp. 448–49, there is no suggestion that Isidore himself saw any connexion between this sort of argument and the narrative genre he had mentioned earlier.
 11. See Huygens's preface to his 1955 edition of the *Dialogus*, pp. 7–12. References are to the text of Conrad in Huygens's 1970 edition of the *Accessus ad auctores*.
 12. p. 89. For a full analysis of the dispute between Conrad and his pupil, see Klopsch, pp. 62–63, and Fritz Peter Knapp, 'Historische Wahrheit und poetische Lüge', pp. 612–13.
 13. See Joachim Suchomski, '*Delectatio*' und '*utilitas*': Ein Beitrag zum Verständnis mittelalterlicher komischer Literatur, Bibliotheca Germanica, 18 (Berne and Munich, 1975), pp. 85–89.
 14. *Warbaere*, derived from *war*, appears to be a neologism of Gottfried's; this passage is the only attestation for the word given by the *Mittelhochdeutsches Wörterbuch*, which glosses it as 'der wahrheit gemäß' (III, 520). Peter Ganz, in an explanatory footnote to the line (6880 in his edition), translates *warbaere* as 'wahrscheinlich'.
 15. Quintilian, *Institutio oratoria*, v.10.26: 'habitus corporis, ducitur enim frequenter in argumentum species libidinis, robur petulantiae, his contraria in diversum'.
 16. 'Die *argumenta a re* zeigen eine reiche Mannigfaltigkeit, ja eine die selbständige Neuschöpfung herausfordernde System-Offenheit . . . Eine Systematisierung der *loci* muß ebenfalls ein Versuch bleiben' (Lausberg, para. 377 (p. 206)).
 17. For instance, Blake Lee Spahr, 'Tristan versus Morolt: Allegory against Reality?', in *Helen Adolf Festschrift*, edited by S. Z. Buehne, J. L. Hodge, and L. B. Pinto (New York, 1968), pp. 72–85. Spahr considers that in Gottfried's account of the combat the real forces of Morolt are ranged against the allegorical army of Tristan, and interprets the entire episode as an allegory of the triumph of justice over injustice.
 18. See above, p. 35, and note 85 to Chapter Two, where the full quotation is given. For Bernard, 'historica narratio' is synonymous with biblical narrative, although others broadened the scope of the term. See Fritz Peter Knapp, 'Historische Wahrheit und poetische Lüge', pp. 613–16.
 19. On these modes see the literature under note 87 to Chapter Two, and also Hans Robert Jauss, 'Entstehung und Strukturwandel der allegorischen Dichtung', in *Grundriß der romanischen Literaturen des Mittelalters*, edited by H. R. Jauss, VI, part 1 (Heidelberg, 1968), 146–244; Christel Meier, 'Überlegungen zum gegenwärtigen Stand der Allegorie-Forschung: Mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der Mischformen', *Frühmittelalterliche Studien*, 10 (1976), 1–69.
 20. Christ, p. 304. The citation is from Wolfgang Monecke, *Studien zur epischen Technik Konrads von Würzburg: Das Erzählprinzip der 'wildekeit'*, Germanistische Abhandlungen, 24 (Stuttgart, 1968), p. 105.